

Rwanda: the Social, Political and Economic Situation

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1. THE IMPACT OF THE ZAIRE CRISIS

1.1 The Forced Repatriation Process

The effect on security in Rwanda of the crisis in Zaire and the forced repatriations has been rather detrimental. The two northern prefectures of Gisenyi and Ruhengeri and to a lesser degree the western ones of Kibuye and Cyangugu have been severely affected by a wave of insecurity and killings which started soon after the forced repatriation of around 600,000 refugees from Zaire last November. These events have their origin in a variety of situations.

First, ex-FAR and former interahamwe have come back, mixed with the returnee crowds. They often kill Tutsi families more or less randomly. At times, when they are moving in organized groups they ambush traffic or even RPA soldiers. These terrorist operations lead to very harsh counterinsurgency reactions on the part of the RPA in which ordinary Hutu civilians are killed. In addition there are many murders, all directly or indirectly linked with the genocide. Some returnees are recognized by survivors as people who have taken part in the genocide and who have killed their relatives. They are then killed in revenge. In other cases it is the former genocidaires who have managed to remain undetected inside Rwanda and who fear to be denounced when some witnesses of their crimes come back from Zaire. They try to quickly kill them before they have time to talk. There are also certain categories of returnees (former civil servants, intellectuals, ex-FAR officers) who are targeted by the present authorities and who are quietly murdered at the first opportunity after their return.¹ And then there are many common crimes committed by thieves who think that the cause of the murders they commit will be attributed to the political violence.

The overall effect of the security crisis has been to create a very dangerous atmosphere,

particularly in the North. Many Tutsi, especially in the military, act as if all Hutu were fair game in any repressive operation after a terrorist act is committed. Even Hutu civilian administrators chosen by the present government do not escape this stigma and they are often threatened or even dismissed from their posts as "accomplices" after attacks occur.²

The tales told by returnees about the actual conditions of their return have very little to do with the official government version of the events, which is that the refugees exercised their free choice in returning to Rwanda as soon as the influence of the former regime's thugs had been removed.

The story is harsher: the camps (Katale and Kahindo in the first phase, Mugunga on 13 November 1997) came under artillery fire and then under direct infantry attack. Losses were severe. Most refugees, remembering the genocide in which many of them had been involved three years earlier, expected to be killed on the spot. So when the assailants left a way open for them towards the Rwandese border they were only too happy to grab this last chance of survival.

But psychologically relations between the returnees and the regime are disastrous. Many refugees are still denying that any genocide occurred at all. They only say that it was "war", refusing to discuss the issue of murdered women and children. The violence which has just been directed at them and the disquieting tales of even bigger massacres inside Zaire which keep filtering back from there provide them with a sort of excuse.³ Their brutal treatment at the hands of the Tutsi Army is felt to be enough of an "evening out of scores" which leaves them in the right and absolves them from any guilt in the (denied) genocide. On their part the Tutsi talk about "national reconciliation" but in practice act as if all Hutu were genocidaires and bore a collective guilt. The returnees are herded like cattle, screened, controlled, pushed around and told to wait for their future reintegration into normal society. Many have failed to achieve that, months after their return, since the integration process seems to be proceeding very slowly and is highly controlled.

1.2 Refugee Reintegration

1.2.1 The Vanishing Hutu

The returnees are obviously scheduled to remain in the imisozi (hills) there to practice basic peasant agriculture. Qualified Hutu returnees who try to get salaried jobs have many problems, as demonstrated by the case of Lieutenant Dr Mugemanshuro, an ex-FAR military doctor who was recently (early February 1997) arrested under the accusation of "attempted terrorism".⁴ He had just found employment at the Gikondo Health Centre run by the Pallottin Fathers. For local Tutsi hardliners, that a Hutu genocidaire (a pleonasm in their view) could be allowed to function in the limited monetary economy was intolerable and he was involved in a fake attempted grenade attack at the Kigali Bus Park. Some educated Hutu are so keenly aware of the problem that they discreetly disappear into the hills and take up agriculture as a measure of personal safety. This author met a former senior civil servant who, although uninvolved in the genocide, decided not to come back to Kigali and claim his house now occupied by an RPA officer, but instead to move to an isolated rugo (traditional family farm). He even traded his own piece of land for another one, smaller and not as good, but which had the advantage of being quite far from any road. He seemed to think that any amount of social visibility could endanger his life. Ordinary Hutu peasants tend to be left alone, both in the good and the bad sense. They are

not bothered, but the level of social services (provision of schools, health centres etc.) in the rural areas is extremely low.

1.2.2 The Tutsi Monopoly of the Monetarized Economy

The towns seem to have become almost exclusively Tutsi preserves. Since the Tutsi newcomers, as opposed to those Tutsi who were slaughtered in the 1994 genocide, tend to be educated people, there is a serious problem of competing for jobs in the monetary sector of the economy.⁵ There is therefore a strong tendency for Tutsi to congregate in the towns in the hope of finding a job in the "modern" economy and an equally strong tendency to try to keep the Hutu on the land. Thus the aim of an integrated society is probably as far away from being realized as it was ten years ago. There is even a certain regression in that residential separation has probably increased if one compares the present situation with that of pre-war Rwanda.

1.3 The Global Impact on the Political Climate inside Rwanda

The change in political climate caused by the war in Zaire is marked. Up to November 1996 the former Hutu regime and army remained a major problem. This caused considerable tension but also obliged the government to include a certain modicum of ethnic cooperation in its thinking. The present situation is apparently drastically altered. The last organized supporters of the former regime are now partly under control, others are dead or in disarray and there are no more precautions to be taken as far as political bargaining is concerned. The Hutu community is thoroughly marginalized politically and economically, and will probably remain so for several years to come, and much of the government's attention is now taken up by the rivalries between the various Tutsi groups.

In a situation of political competition, any group will tend to divide itself along any cleavage lines which create the possibility of group solidarity in order to secure benefits. Thus the Tutsi, being now alone on the political scene and being in competition for scarce jobs in the monetarized sector, have tended to fragment along solidarity group lines. Life in exile has considerably weakened the old aristocratic intra-Tutsi divisions, i.e. between high and low lineages. These have been replaced by friendship and solidarity networks born out of exile. Thus the present groups are loosely centered around country-of-exile origins and people speak commonly of "Ugandans", "Tanzanians", "Zairians" and "Burundese", meaning not natives of these countries but Banyarwanda Tutsi who have spent their exile years in them. Then there are subtle solidarity networks inside each group according to age, family, biographical profile and so on. Jobs and power depend on network performance and support. Yet these rivalries cannot go beyond a certain point because of the security problems which we have mentioned above and which are unlikely to disappear in the near future.⁶ In March this new political climate generated a crisis.

2. THE MARCH POLITICAL CRISIS IN RWANDA

2.1 The Causes of the 28 March Cabinet Reshuffle

The background in the general political climate has already been outlined above. The more direct causes have to do with the involvement of Colonel Alexis Kanyarengwe in the northern security problems. A Hutu soldier from the Ruhengeri area, Colonel

Kanyarengwe was a close associate of General Habyarimana and played a role in his takeover in 1973. In 1980 he was involved in an attempted coup d'etat, aiming at the overthrow of his friend, and had to flee to Tanzania. After ten years in exile he joined the RPF in 1990 and became its nominal Secretary General. When the RPF won in 1994 he was made Vice Prime Minister, a largely honorary position, and when his Hutu colleague Seth Sendashonga was eliminated from the Ministry of the Interior in August 1995, he took his place. A brutal man and former Hutu Power devotee in his youth, he had become the willing tool of the RPF's Tutsi power structure during the war years.

As a native of the Ruhengeri prefecture Colonel Kanyarengwe was considered to be a natural "protector" (shebujá in Kinyarwanda) for the people of his area. In fact he had managed to recruit a number of Hutu soldiers into the Tutsi-dominated RPA, not a mean feat. Therefore his political situation became very difficult when in early 1997 many people of his area were being killed in counter-insurgency sweeps. By February the situation had worsened to the point where many members of his direct family had also been killed. When on 3 March 1997 over 150 people were killed in the communes of Kigombe, Mukingo and Nyakinama (Ruhengeri prefecture) in reprisal for the murders of two RPA soldiers, he felt he had to act. He organized a meeting in the North where he supported the Ruhengeri prefect Ignace Karuhije who had denounced the violence and asked for the arrest of Major Rugambwa, the commander of Battalion 199 responsible for the killings. Rugambwa was briefly detained, but was later freed and it was prefect Karuhije who was first arrested and later dismissed from his position. On 27 March Kanyarengwe was forced to resign his post of Minister of the Interior, and his position of Vice Prime Minister was abolished. He remained nominal head of the RPF, something of a joke since he was totally politically isolated within the Front and absolutely powerless. But his resignation triggered a general cabinet reshuffle of far-reaching consequences.

2.2 A New Government or a New Regime?

The new government did not outwardly differ very much from the preceding one. Out of eighteen ministries there were only three or four minor adjustments and five complete changes. But these changes and the way in which they were carried out were highly indicative of a new order of things in the political structure of post-genocide Rwanda. First, eliminating Colonel Kanyarengwe from the Ministry of the Interior and replacing him with a particularly lacklustre person was a major signal in itself. The new Interior Minister, Abdul Karim Harerimana, is a political lightweight. Of uncertain parentage, considered "a Hutu by defect", he is a Muslim brought up in Tanzania who does not belong to any political party. He has no independent political constituency and will be a pliable tool in the hands of the RPF power structure. After the elimination of Seth Sendashonga and Faustin Twagiramungu in August 1995, Kanyarengwe was the last Hutu in government who could be said to have a truly independent political constituency. His removal is a symbol of the total elimination of the Hutu community as a political partner in the so-called "coalition government".

Another case was that of Marc Ruganera, Minister of Finance, who was demoted to the newly created Ministry of Tourism, Mines and Crafts. But since there is no tourism and there are no mines the Minister's job is to administer a handful of arts and crafts cooperatives. In a lesser way than Kanyarengwe, Ruganera was also an autonomous Hutu politician. He was one of the last surviving leaders of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD), most of whose leaders, all liberal Hutu, were killed during the genocide. Ruganera had his

own constituency in the South and was an able administrator. In his position as Minister of Finance he had often questioned the disbursement of large unauthorized sums of money to the military, and the RPA leadership were looking for an opportunity to remove him.

Ruganera was replaced by Jean Birara, former Head of the Central Bank under President Habyarimana and Minister for Planning. Birara is a technocrat, a very able administrator, but not a politician. Recently when he was asked by the Belgian Senate Commission of Inquiry on Rwanda to come to Brussels and testify, he initially accepted but later withdrew his acceptance when the Rwandese government frowned upon his giving testimony. He is unlikely to cause many problems in his new position.

Then there is the curious case of Patrick Mazimpaka. Contrary to the two preceding ministers he is a Tutsi. But he spent all his years of exile in Canada, which means that, unlike the "Ugandans", the "Zairians" or the "Burundese" he has no basic network of influence. Although a founding member of RPF, he also happens to be considered as a moderate. He was Minister of Rehabilitation and Social Solidarity. But on 28 March his Ministry was abolished, a somewhat surprising move in the light of the return of over one million refugees within a few days in November 1996, a development which did seem to call for both "rehabilitation" and "social solidarity". Patrick Mazimpaka himself was made Minister in the President's Office, a high-sounding title for a very ambiguous position. Not that the President did not need a man of confidence near him. A Hutu member of RPF without any personal following of his own, President Pasteur Bizimungu is extremely isolated and under intense personal pressure. His children were bullied in school by Tutsi children⁷ and he has had to take them away and keep them at home with private tutors. He is discreetly sniggered at by even his closest Tutsi aides and has at times reacted with physical violence (spitting, slapping) leading to rumours of mental imbalance. But he already has a guardian angel in the person of Colonel Frank Mugambage, a well-connected member of the "Ugandan" group. One month after his nomination at this apparently duplicate post, Patrick Mazimpaka still did not have an office at the Presidency and still had not managed to have an interview with his old RPF comrade Mugambage to define the relationship between their respective posts. The change looked more like sidetracking than like a promotion.

The Rehabilitation and Social Solidarity job was demoted to the level of a secretariat d'Etat which was given to a new person, Beatrice Sebatware-Panda. This seemed like an odd choice since she is the daughter of a well-known Hutu genocidaire who is on the wanted list of the International Tribunal in Arusha. With such a criminal father, it is probable that Ms Sebatware-Panda will also prove to be rather compliant. For the time being it seemed she had practically no means to work with the Hutu returnees.

The other changes - Bonaventure Niyibizi at the Ministry of Trade and Dr Vincent Biruta at the Ministry of Health - have brought to these positions two capable young Tutsi who have expertise in their fields but no political experience whatsoever, and who consider themselves to be "technical ministers".

But at least as much as these changes, it was the manner in which they were carried out which was significant. The regime acted within 48 hours to complete the reshuffle, consulting nobody, especially not the political parties, and making no mention of the Arusha Agreement or of the Government Convention of 24 November 1994 or of any other constitutional or para-constitutional dispositions. The reshuffle was an arbitrary act,

with ministers dismissed or chosen secretly. The absence of any reference to political parties confirmed their actual demise, not that they mattered very much in themselves. Their progressive marginalization had been obvious since 1995 and not much of their former strength was left. But the fact that they were so unceremoniously buried signalled an end to any pretence of a democratic regime in Rwanda. As we shall see in the next section, the symmetry between the political promotion of the Army and the disappearance of the political parties has in fact turned Rwanda into a de facto collegial military dictatorship.

2.3 The Rise to Power of the RPA "Ugandan" Colonels

The present power structure in Rwanda is dual. There is of course a government but this government carries out policies, it does not define them. To give an example of how this works, late last year the then Minister of Finance, Marc Rugege, was asked point blank by an RPA colonel to give him US\$ 500,000 "to take care of urgent matters". When asked to state in greater detail what the money was for he said it was to pay his men. The Minister then asked him for a detailed list of personnel for whom this money was earmarked and what their salaries were. Whereupon the Colonel exploded and told Rugege that he would "hear about it". Later Vice President and Minister of Defence Major General Paul Kagame phoned Rugege and told him to pay the US\$ 500,000 to the Colonel "for the good of the country". Rugege did not push the matter any further and arranged for payment of the monies. This illustrates fairly well the relationship between the Army and the civilian government.

Practically all the key men in the power structure are "Ugandans", and practically all are either RPA officers or former RPA officers. In the Security organs it is common to let an innocuous Hutu officer take the official No 1 position. But the real power is the No 2. This is true in the case of Colonel Kayumba-Nyamwase of the gendarmerie or of Colonel Patrick Karegaya of the Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI). The name of this body is directly borrowed from the corresponding Ugandan service. Major-General Kagame was second in command of DMI in Uganda before the 1 October 1990 attack. The name of the service has never been translated into French and it is the almost exclusive preserve of former Ugandan Army officers. It keeps files on all political personnel and had targeted as "accomplices of the infiltrators" all the various Hutu politicians who have been marginalized in the last two years. Keeping tabs on the others helps keep them in line.

There are many colonels in civilian positions, such as Emmanuel Ndahiro, who is a personal aide to Major-General Kagame and his ears and eyes when he accompanies cabinet Ministers on foreign trips, Ephraim Kabaijja who is a special adviser on the question of the Zaire returnees or the already mentioned Frank Mugambage who shadows President Bizimungu. Claude Dusaidi, General Kagame's diplomatic adviser, is also a "Ugandan".

In the Army the same group of "Ugandan" colonels holds key positions, such as Colonel Fred Ibingira who is head of the Kigali Military Region.⁸ The "Ugandan colonels", whether in the Army or outside it, are the real new elite of the country. They rely on a second tier of non military "Ugandans" who were their friends, relatives and associates back in Uganda and try, as far as possible, to monopolize all the good jobs in the monetary sector of the economy. In fact many have relatives who have stayed in Uganda, perhaps as a kind of "insurance policy" in case things go really bad in Rwanda, and many

are shuttling back and forth. Among the "shuttlers" some end up deciding that it is better for them to stay in Uganda, thus widening the network.

3. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION AND ITS POLITICAL EFFECTS

3.1 The Town/Country Economic and Social Split

The security situation has exacerbated a tendency which predated even the war. Given the fact that their life had been difficult in the hills and also given their higher level of education in colonial Rwanda, the Tutsi had tended very early on to move to the cities, where they constituted more than their overall 10 per cent of the population. But this trend was only in operation during the colonial period and under the Hutu Republic, and the majority of the Tutsi were still tillers of the soil. The massive slaughter of April-June 1994 almost completely destroyed the rural Tutsi community. The survivors huddled in Red Cross IDP camps (away from similar IDP camps for the Hutu) and most of them never went back to their imisozi after the RPF victory. These are the people who are today being resettled in the UN-sponsored resettlement schemes which will be discussed below.

During and after the war around 700,000 Tutsi came to Rwanda from abroad, numerically roughly replacing their dead peasant relatives. But they were not the same type of people at all. They were mostly moderately to well educated people and most of them had no notion of agriculture. Those who were not educated tended to be herdsmen and came back with large quantities of cattle. These have tended to settle in the Mutara plain of eastern Rwanda and are now encroaching on the Akagera National Park which is likely to disappear and be turned into ranchland. But the educated ones were the majority and they took over most of the urban properties (houses, shops, small factories) belonging to the Hutu who had fled. Most of the urbanized Hutu had fled because on the one hand many were among the leaders of the genocide, and on the other hand they feared the RPF more than did the hill dwellers, who felt they could weather the storm more easily in a rural environment. It is now out of the question for the Tutsi returnees to give these properties back to their "rightful" owners. Many Tutsi returnees of 1994 argue that these properties were built on land which belonged to them anyway and which the Hutu stole during the violent years of 1959-1964. Since the Hutu elite is fearful of the Tutsi security apparatus, it tends not to press too hard for restitution of its properties.

The result is a dichotomized economy, with the Hutu on the land, working at subsistence farming, and a town-based monetarized economy practically entirely in Tutsi hands. Not only is this economic dichotomy a problem for any future rehabilitation and development of the country, it is also a major social and political problem. The preceding regime, in spite of its *rubanda nyamwinshi* ("majority people") ideology was anything but democratic. But the Hutu elite had deep country roots. Every civil servant, right up to the cabinet ministers and the top Army officers had relatives in the country. Every weekend people went back to the hills. They acted as small sultans and displayed an exaggerated idea of their own worth. But at least they were there. The Hutu peasant in the hills entertained a complex relationship with his successful city cousins. He was told they ruled in his interest. He knew this was not true but he was flattered that they needed to lie to him in order to keep up the fiction of a "peasant-based democracy". They taxed him and

forced him to work "for the public interest". He evaded the taxes when he could but accepted the fact that at least some of the forced labour was indeed in the public interest. He knew the men in power, even if indirectly. They had relatives nearby. The government ferociously extracted peasant agriculture surplus value from the toiling masses. But the men who stole that surplus value were "our boys" and if one felt that he had to try avoiding the worst forms of exploitation the relationship was nevertheless always one resembling a domestic quarrel rather than a foreign feud. This picture was of course truer in the North, while the southern banyanduga Hutu were much more alienated from the government than their northern or eastern brethren.

Today the situation is completely different. The Hutu peasant could understand being ruled by a land-based Tutsi aristocracy. After all this had been the case before 1959. But he cannot understand being ruled by a town-based alien business class. "These people are foreigners" is an often-heard remark. Or even, as one more educated person said: "They are like beings from outer space. They speak our language but they are different from us". This by the way is a remark no Hutu would think of making about a Tutsi genocide survivor who lived in the country before 1994. But with the 1994 returnees the "us/them" feeling is strong. Even Tutsi survivors will at times use the same expression about their exiled relatives who have come back.

In order to understand the problem one has to realize that the expression "exiled relatives who came back" is deceptive. The people who "came back" are not the same as those who left. Thirty years went by and given African mortality rates, the vast majority of the exiles who came into Rwanda in 1994 were either raised or even born abroad. Major-General Kagame, the country's strongman, left Rwanda when he was two years old. The Hutu regime never talked about refugees because refugees have to be allowed back home. The expression used was "the Rwandese abroad" ("les Rwandais de l'etranger"), even in 1990 after the creation of the joint Rwando-Ugandan Committee for Repatriation. And the "Rwandese abroad" legislation never allowed any of these people to come back to Rwanda, even for a short holiday or to visit relatives. Thus the "Rwandese abroad" community grew up with a magic and unreal sense of Rwanda which had very little to do with the real Rwanda and much to do with the stories and fantasies told by their parents and grandparents about the world they had left behind. After the genocide, finding a tiny, bloody, poor and ruined country was for many a great disappointment, which could turn them from idealism to cynicism and towards the hope for quick money.

For better or for worse, the 1959 Hutu regime had been a peasant regime. Not as it pretended a "peasant democracy" but a peasant-based patrimonial oligarchy. Practically all the pre-1994 city dwellers had grown up in the banana fields. Today's rulers grew up in refugee camps and in cities. They are not only Tutsi they are "aliens" in the double sense of being foreign-born and educated and of being urban people in a land where 92 per cent of the population are peasant farmers. The dominant feeling expressed by Hutu farmers when they speak about their new masters is - more than fear - a feeling of strangeness.

Halfway between the Hutu peasants and the Tutsi shopkeepers and small businessmen stand the Tutsi genocide survivors in their roadside resettlement schemes. One wonders how these will ever work. The houses are built on tiny overcrowded plots, the inhabitants have no land to cultivate and they are scattered miles away from urban services. The settlements are prefabricated rural slums in the middle of nowhere, with no economic base to support them. The NGO workers who work in them estimate that gardening, poultry

farming and crafts can support perhaps up to 25-30 per cent of the resettlement dwellers. Many of those are widows with dependents and they feel rather desperate. One common remark is: "All of us survivors are now in one place. This will make it easier for the Hutu to kill us during the next genocide". Although the government is supposed to be a "Tutsi regime" their lack of interest in these poor rural Tutsi is evident. They have very little to do with the new power elite, except when they are lucky enough to have foreign-born relatives who can sponsor their entry into the new order of things.

3.2 The RPA and the Economics of the Zairian Conquest

The central economy is somewhat disconnected from these basic realities. There are few working documents on the economy and there are no statistics worth the name.⁹ The fundamental reality of the economy which is not really discussed in the existing documents is that two-thirds of the budget come from foreign aid (the tax base is extremely limited) and that the Army appropriates 50 per cent of the monies actually available, as opposed to the amounts pledged by the foreign community. These are often pledged for diplomatic reasons and never in fact disbursed or only disbursed twelve or eighteen months later.

Given these basic political constraints on the budget it is extremely difficult to imagine a very creative economic policy. The IMF and World Bank documents mentioned above read more like a wish list than a realistic policy framework. Items like the privatization of state enterprises do not sound very realistic in the present context unless one means their being taken over by the "Ugandans".

It is in this light that one should look at the continued presence of many young Banyarwanda Tutsi officers around President Laurent-Desire Kabila in Kinshasa. The Kivu anti-refugee campaign and later the Rwandese participation in the overthrow of the Zairian regime were primarily motivated by security-related considerations. But there was also an economic dimension to the operation. Rwanda is poor, landlocked, overpopulated and almost devoid of any economic future. The last reasonably accurately computed rate of demographic growth at the beginning of the war (1991) gave a growth rate of 3.6 per cent. Judging from the many pregnancies one can see in Rwanda today, among both communities, it is probable that there is a steady growth. Acquiring a stake, by hook or by crook, in the potentially rich Zairian economy was and remains a national priority. Problems can be expected to develop around this issue between President Kabila and his Rwandese sponsors and one can reasonably guess that the recent meeting of the Communauté Economique des Pays des Grands Lacs (CEPGL) on 26 June, besides its security aspects, certainly became a forum for such discussions.¹⁰

4. CONCLUSION

The main impression one gets from the situation in Rwanda today when one compares it with the pre-war system is that there are many similarities. One socio-ethnic group is marginalized. The power structure is far removed from the ordinary population. The economy is highly aid-dependent. There are almost no elements of democracy, not only at the political level (this can hardly be expected in the aftermath of a genocide) but even at the level of civil society. The main difference is of course that the group which now has the upper hand represents only around 10 per cent of the total population. It has no perceived legitimacy among the peasant masses and it is highly defensive because the memory of the genocide is present in everybody's mind.

The Hutu for their part appear sullen, resentful and unrepentant. The violent repression carried out by the Tutsi minority seems to somehow legitimate in their minds their own recent genocidal practice which they both deny and justify at the same time. This is one of the most frustrating aspects of discussing with the Hutu. The genocide is both denied and then in fact recognized but ascribed to "war". When one asks how old people and babies could be killed if it were "war", the answer is that "in Africa there is no distinction between combatant and non combatant", an attitude which was in some way also demonstrated by the present Rwandese regime in its treatment of the Hutu refugees who had stayed behind in Zaire after the November 1996 mass repatriation.

The total failure of the International Tribunal to produce anything like a recognizable modicum of justice for the genocide reinforces the complementary attitudes of the two communities. For the Tutsi it is: "We have our backs to the wall. Unless we maintain absolute control they will finish us next time." And for the Hutu: "We only have to wait, numbers will play in our favour and the so-called international community will neither want nor be able to stop us." It is therefore difficult to see how in such a context governmental authority can be exercised except by repression, and national reconciliation is still a very remote prospect indeed.

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NOTES

1. See for example the "disappearance" in mid-March 1997 of forty-seven ex-FAR officers recently returned from Zaire, who were under the "protection" of the 402nd Brigade of the RPA in Rubungo. BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, 26 March 1997, quoting Radio Rwanda
 2. See below, 2.1 The Causes of the 28 March Cabinet Reshuffle.
 3. Although the alleged massacres are still being investigated, some of the preliminary findings are rather grim. See Eleanor Bedford, Site visit to Eastern Congo/Zaire: Analysis of Humanitarian and Political Issues (Washington DC: US Committee for Refugees, 10 June 1997); Medecins Sans Frontiers-Holland, Report on the Bukavu-Shabunda Area of South Kivu (Amsterdam, 16 April 1997); Doctors Without Borders-USA, Forced Flight: A Brutal Strategy of Elimination in Eastern Zaire (New York, 16 May 1997)
 4. Forces de Resistance pour la Democratie (FRD), "Rwanda: le bilan s'alourdit de semaine en semaine" (Press Release No 028/97), 12 March 1997
 5. See below, 3. THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC SITUATION AND ITS POLITICAL EFFECTS
 6. There are still many armed clashes in Kivu, with a tendency to border overspill. This was what motivated the recent meeting in Bukavu between President Kabila and Brigadier Paul Kagame. See The Economist, "Legacy of Genocide", 21 June 1997
 7. They were called "children of the Protector" (a local brand of condoms), an allusion to the fact that the Hutu President is used by the Tutsi regime as a public relations device.
 8. Colonel Ibingira was the local commanding officer in April 1995 when the Kibeho Internally Displaced Persons' camp came under attack from the RPA, causing over 4,000 casualties. He was tried in late 1996, given a six-month suspended sentence for "negligence" and walked out of the courtroom a free man to take up within days his command in the Kigali Military Region.
 9. The only noteworthy documents are International Monetary Fund, Memorandum on the Economic and Financial Policies of the Government of Rwanda (Washington DC, 21 March 1997) and World Bank, Rwanda: Post-conflict Rehabilitation - a Framework of Economic Policies 1997-1998 (Washington DC, 10 April 1997). Both documents are highly speculative in the absence of any statistics and of any monitoring of the only "real" economy i.e. the informal economy.
 10. The French-sponsored CEPGL is a regional organization which was created twenty years ago to promote economic development. Apart from minor achievements in the domain of trade its plans have never really materialized.
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