

**FINAL REPORT OF THE UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL MISSION  
ON THE  
SECURITY SITUATION IN THE RWANDESE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE**

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# FINAL REPORT OF UNITED NATIONS TECHNICAL MISSION ON THE SECURITY SITUATION IN THE RWANDESE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE

## INTRODUCTION

The Rwandese conflict created one of the largest and fastest exoduses of refugees in modern history as one to 1.2 million People are estimated to have fled Rwanda and crossed into the Kivu region of Zaire (Goma and Bukavu) in four days. The dramatic effect and *experience* of this large concentration of refugees in Zaire have been quite challenging for the UN agencies and NGOs who responded Promptly; *and traumatic for the host country population and, of course, far the multitude of the Rwandese refugees themselves.*

Largely overcrowded and chaotic. camp condition; continue to be exceptionally difficult for the refugee population while adversely affecting the host Population by exacerbating the economic, socio-political and environmental degradation of the Kivu region.

Even though hostilities in Rwanda are believed to have now ebbed. voluntary repatriation continues to be very slow because of fear on the part *of the refugees to return* home to unknown circumstances; and principally *due to the absence of security* within the camps and the intimidation of refugees advocating or wishing to return to Rwanda by militant elements within the camps. The result is that a paltry 250,000 refugees have reportedly returned by September, while the overall situation continues to deteriorate

The United Nations Secretary-General, sharing the preoccupation of the Zairian Government authorities about this very unsatisfactory state of affairs, dispatched his Special Representative of UNAMIR. Ambassador Shaharyar Khan, to hold discussions with top Zairian Government officials on 12, 13, and 14 September 1994.

While generally agreeing *that* the voluntary and spontaneous repatriation of refugees in peace and dignity represented the *best solution.* Ambassador Khan and the Zairian *authorities agreed, inter alia, on the need* for additional refugee camps in Zaire at an appropriate distance from the *border* to accommodate ex-army units and political leaders (and their families). The cost of opening these new camps and the logistical support for the transfer and running costs would be borne by the United Nations.

It was further agreed that a *Joint Commission be formed by the* United Nations on the one hand and the Zairian Government on the other in order to assess the logistical framework of the **operation**, the **location** of the sites, the **capital** and running costs of the camps and the security requirements of the exercise.

This Joint Commission, comprising seven United Nations staff members (UNAMIR - five, UNHCR - one and UNDP - one) and 10 Zairian Government officials, and commenced

by Lt Col Kayumbi, Logistics Corps ZAR;

x. Capt Kabamba wa Kasanda. representative for the Field Engineer corps ZAF.  
TERMS OF REFERENCE

The Commission's terms of reference are as follows:

- a. To visit the refugee camps in the North and South Kivu provinces of Zaire;
- b. To visit new camp sites identified by the Zairian Government
- c. *To explore how best to identify and separate the various categories of refugees, i.e. Military element, political leaders, militia - to include Interahamwe - and ordinary Rwandese refugees*
- d. To relocate the political leaders and military personnel with their families;
- e. To determine the costs and logistics requirements for the operation in (d) above.

#### **4. METHODOLOGY**

The Commission visited the provinces of North and South Kivu and held discussions with the different partners involved in handling the refugee crisis, notably the local authorities, *UN* agencies, and humanitarian organizations. Through these discussions it was able to obtain a clear picture of the refugee situation within the camps and of the different categories of refugees whose relocation or repatriation is *being envisaged*. It also met with three of the main categories, the refugee population in the camps the political leaders, and the military hierarchy. For practical reasons, it was not possible to meet with one of the key components of *refugees*, namely the militant youth *groups*. *Nonetheless*, information on the latter was obtained *from those officials on the spot* who are in daily contact with the refugees. The Commission then visited the relocation sites proposed by the Zairian Government set order to assess the *logistical*, operational / security, humanitarian, socio-political, and financial implications of this exercise, as well as to envisage a realistic plan for its eventual implementation.

The present report provides a synthesis of then findings, conclusions and recommendations of the Commission. *It attempts to identify the categories and numbers of refugees* involved, assesses the possible reasons for the present stall in the voluntary repatriation that had reached its peak in August 1994, examines the relevant issues concerning the separation, relocation or repatriation of *the various categories*, and makes recommendations concerning the implementation of this exercise, as well as other relevant matters. It comprises a number of annexes which deal with specific aspects of the report, including an appraisal of the proposed relocation sites.

#### **5. CATEGORIES OF REFUGEES TO BE MOVED**

##### **5.1 Interahamwe**

Although insecurity in the camps is of different kinds, ranging from ordinary banditry and extortion to gang wars between rival groups fighting for control of the camps the most crucial security threat both for the refugees and for the local population is posed by the militant activities of militiamen, otherwise known as Interahamwe. This category of refugees on whom most of the mass killings in

Rwanda in April and May 1994 have been blamed, is the most complex and difficult to physically identify. Unlike soldiers, they neither wear uniforms nor carry any outward signs or symbols that can distinguish them from the rest of the civilian refugee population. They are reported to be in possession of firearms and grenades, and are equipped with vehicles and radio communication equipment which enable them to listen in on UNHCR security communications. They have also set up an effective co-ordination structure within the camps similar to the one they had during the mass killings in Rwanda in April and May 1994.

On the day the commission arrived, fighting between the Interahamwe militiamen and a security group set up by the former Rwandese scouts Association (with UNHCR help), left at least two people dead and about five wounded. On the following day, this group took over the entire camp, sealing it off temporarily. Eyewitness reports from the camps talked of some 150 men patrolling the camps in search of two CARE workers.

Although the Interahamwe are known to be present in all civilian camps in North and South Kivu, they are much more active in North Kivu, where they are known to control all access into and out of the camps, and to consider the more moderate scouts association as well as any other group that either encourage.; or is indifferent to voluntary repatriation as pro-RPF. According to some members of the former Government, one reason for the massive presence of these militiamen in Goma was the fact that Goma was nearer to Gisenyi and Ruhengeri than Bukavu, and these two towns had been the Strongholds of the late President's MRND party, of which Interahamwe was the youth wing. Also, since the former Government left through the Goma area and were protected by the Interahamwe, they followed them. The militiamen have succeeded in creating an atmosphere of terror in the camps, making it virtually impossible for the refugees, NGOs and UN agencies to even raise any issues relating to repatriation, relocation, or the separation of the militia from the rest of the refugees.

No one seems to know exactly how many of those militiamen are in the camp. UNHCR has estimated that in Mugunga camp in North Kivu about 84 per cent of the youth belong to Interahamwe. During one of the meetings with the Rwandese former Minister of Information, he revised the UNHCR estimate downward to about 60 per cent. In spite of the wide variation between these figures, they indicate one thing. namely, that the Interahamwe boast a significant presence in all camps in the Goma area, and that their influence is fast spreading to Bukavu where several incidents of violence and intimidation have been reported by both UNHCR and its operational partners.

## **5.2 The political leaders**

*The:* Mission also found it *difficult to obtain Accurate figures on the numbers of former Rwandese leaders such as ministers, senior government and military officials, members of parliament and other political personalities*. The official position of the Zairian provincial authorities was that, ever since the dignitaries had been advised to leave, they had stopped all contacts with the Zairian authorities, thus making it impossible for the Government to know how many of this category of refugees still resided )n the *North and south Kivu provinces*. Since news of the

politicians envisaged relocation had preceded the arrival of the Commission, the dignitaries with whom the Commission met were rather reluctant to provide such information. In the end, however, it was possible to obtain from the military and political hierarchy in Bukavu the following figures on the political leaders presently sheltering in Zaire: 1 former Head of State, 21 former ministers, 54 members of parliament, 9 Senior Division Officers, 126 Mayors, and 18 officials of political parties. These figures add up to a total number of 228 political leaders to be moved. From this figure, the Commission estimates that in case of relocation, an appropriate working figure, including dependants would be around 1,200.

*In spite of the official position of the provincial authorities, the Commission learnt from the dignitaries themselves that they continue to be in constant contact with the authorities.*

### **5.3 The army**

The situation of this category of refugees is equally unclear, be it *in terms of physical* identification, location, numbers or status. It is true that many of the soldiers still wear uniform. However, the military commanders with whom the Commission met all confirmed that they were actively *encouraging the soldiers* to seek their own means of survival. One outcome of this recommendation from the military hierarchy has *been soldiers swapping their* uniforms for civilian clothes and *mingling with the civilian* refugees in the latter's camps in all the camps visited by the Commission there were visible signs of the presence of the military. At Inera camp for instance, where the refugee leaders *and CARITAS* denied the presence of any soldiers of the former army, a Zairian army captain on the Commission recognized a Rwandese army officer in civilian clothes with whom he had studied in the Royal *Military* Academy in Belgium. This means that a number of the soldiers have merged with the civilian population, making the identification of the military difficult.

In terms of the physical location of the soldiers, the situation *in North Kivu* is different from that in South Kivu. In North Kivu, there *is no separate camp reserved* exclusively for the military. Mugunga camp, located at 10 km outside Goma had been initially intended for the military, but once opened, was occupied by civilian refugees and is now occupied indistinctly by both soldiers and civilians. In South Kivu on the other hand, the physical location of the soldiers is more organized. There are two military camps, one in Pansi, just outside Bukavu town, and the other in Bulonge further away. Pansi camp figures provided to the commission upon request uses mostly married soldiers and their families, as well as the sick and handicapped, while Bulonge is reserved for the able-bodied and single soldiers.

The figures obtained from UNHCR and the Rwandese military hierarchy do not seem to add up. While UNHCR puts the number of soldiers in North Kivu at between 22,000 and 25,000 the former RGF Chief of Staff based in Goma, General Augustin Bizimungu, estimates that there are 11,000 soldiers and some 4,460 dependants based in Goma. In Bukavu the most senior officer in Pansi camp, Colonel Théonase Nyilimanzu, put the total number of soldiers in South Kivu at 10,000, of whom 4,000 were at Pansi and 6,000 at Bulonge. He estimated the number of dependants at 6,000. This would make a total of 16,000 for South Kivu,

including dependants. Colonel Nyilimanzu also indicated that the former Forces Armées Rwandese (FAR) had a total of 30,000 men before the latest civil war. At a final meeting with the former PAR Deputy Chief of Staff and Head of Operations, General Gratien Kabirigi, yet other figures came up suggesting a total force of 31,000 of whom 20,000 are based in *North Kivu*, and 11,000 in *South Kivu*. To this figure would be added some 19,000 dependants. Based on all these figures and on information gathered informally, the Commission estimates that a realistic figure of RGF soldiers and their dependants present in Zaire could be put at 50,000. This figure includes two Generals and 86 other senior officers. In the event of relocation, however, a realistic working figure would have to take account of desertions, resistance to relocation, those that have already joined the RPA, and those who might be encouraged to move elsewhere to avoid being transferred. This could leave about 30,000 people to be moved, including dependants. This is the figure that the Commission used for planning purposes.

It should be pointed out that during *the* mission, no official information was obtained from the Zairian authorities with regard to the former Rwandese presidential guard. For their part, the RGF official *in Bukavu* estimated the number of soldiers in this category at one battalion (about 800 men) based in *Goma and Bukavu*. They further denied information gathered informally in *Goma and Bukavu* that this category of soldiers were camped together at a location around Goma, with their weaponry intact. If this information were confirmed, it would seem to indicate that this category of soldiers is being treated specially and constitutes a high degree of danger officially, however, the Zairian authorities have declared that all Rwandese troops who sought refuge in Zaire in July 1994 have been disarmed, although they do not rule out the possibility that, given the chaos that characterized the arrival of the troops, the disarming exercise might not have been effective. This is borne out by the number of violent incidents reported in the camps involving firearms. It is also corroborated by UNHCR reports of continued military activity along the border involving some 325 Rwandese soldiers in Kanaganino and some 600 in Kamanyola. A Rwandese colonel has been constantly seen moving between Kamanyola, Luvungi and Kanganino, and movement of RGF officers between Mugunga in North Kivu and Bukavu has recently increased. In spite of this activity, UNHCR and NGOs assisting refugees in the camps believe that the military have not so far constituted as much of a significant factor of insecurity in the camps as have the Interahamwe. The true situation, however, remains unclear.

Figures provided on request by General Gratien Kabirigi to the Head of the UN delegation on the Commission.

The international status of the soldiers has remained confused since their arrival in Zaire. Following UNHCR criteria for classifying refugees, they are not considered as refugees, because *they* are soldiers in uniform. On the other hand, they do not fall under ICRC's mandate, because *they* are no longer in a *situation of war*, and are consequently not in need of protection from immediate danger. The result has been that, apart from the link support provided by CARITAS and CARE in Pansi camp, the military have not been receiving any relief assistance, except for those that have mingled with the civilian refugee-population. Discussions within the Commission led it to conclude that the closest the international community could come towards resolving the status issue would be to adopt the approach of Mulinen's,

proposal of what could pertain in such instances and assimilate the soldiers as prisoners of war (since they remain soldiers according to the Zairian military code), thus bringing them under the mandate of *the ICRC*. *The ICRC Chief* of Sub-delegation in Bukavu confirmed this possibility to the Commission, further adding that *it* would be entirely up to the Zairian Government to confirm the prisoner-of-war status of these soldiers before ICRC intervention could be envisaged.

#### **5.4 The civilian refugee population**

This category of refugees constitutes the bulk of the total Rwandese refugee population. They are currently sheltered in camps run by UNHCR and other operational partners in North and South Kivu. UNHCR presently estimates that there are 850,000 refugees in North Kivu, in the Mugunga, Kibumba and Katale areas, and 336,736 in South Kivu, of whom 281,912 are spread over 28 sites around Bukavu and around 54,824 in 18 camps in and around Uvira. Although life in these camps has greatly improved in comparison with the situation in July and August 1994, living conditions are still extremely difficult, 'with refugees having to make do with about one third of what is considered as the normal daily caloric requirement.

Life in the camps is presently relatively well organized. Leaders have been selected and other structures created, often with UNHCR support, to facilitate the distribution of supplies and ensure security. Although the leaders selected by the refugees are different from the former political leaders, the latter continue to influence opinion in the *camps*. *The camp* leaders believe that their fate is tied to that of the political leaders and the military, and consult with them on a regular basis on all important matters including voluntary repatriation. Opinion in the camps is, however, greatly influenced by the Interahamwe, using physical threats and even murder to impose its views.

### **6. REASONS FOR THE PRESENT STALL IN REPATRIATION**

From its discussion with representatives of the different categories of the refugees, the provincial authorities, UN agencies and humanitarian organizations, the Commission WAS able to discern three phases in the movement of the refugee population since July. First, there was the massive influx in mid-July 1994 brought about by a real or perceived fear of revenge killings by the RPF. Then came the expressed will of the refugees to return, and the actual return of an estimated 200,000 refugees confined by UNHCR in August and the beginning of September. This second phase was visibly characterized on the one hand by the militant activity of militiamen and the political leaders opposed to voluntary repatriation and, *on the* other hand, by the readiness of UNHCR to promote and assist voluntary repatriation. Third phase, which is actually the present phase, is characterized by a drastic cut-back in the number of voluntary returnees. Through its discussions in and outside the camps, the Commission was able to establish the following main reasons for the significant cutback in the numbers of voluntary returnees:

## 6.1 Fear

During the meetings, it became clear to the Commission members That the main factor that negatively affected repatriation was fear on the part of the refugees of RPA reprisals against the background of reported atrocities and massacres of Tutsis and moderates Hutus during the war. Reference was also *made to the alleged* killing of Hutus in the past, including the massacres in 1472 of over 300,000 Hutus by Tutsi in Burundi

## 6.2 The historical factor

Repeatedly, refugees in the various camps and the former dignitaries informed the commission that the root cause of the Rwandese problem lies in what they call 'four hundred years of Tutsi oppression of the Hutu majority Population stating that this historical perspective makes them dread the emergence of yet another period of Tutsi hegemony. Even though the: Commission explained that the new ' Broad-based Government of National Unity (BBGNU) of Rwanda comprises both Hutu and Tutsi leaders they did not appear to support that view, as they maintained that the real power in the present arrangement was in the hands of the Tutsis.

## 6.3 UNHCR reports of *systematic killings*

The Commission noted the readiness of the political *leaders and those* representing the refugees in the camps to believe UNHCR reports of systematic killings by the Rwandese Government, while admitting that they did not have concrete proof to corroborate such reports, and to dismiss UNAMIR's appraisal of the situation which had questioned such reports on the grounds of insufficient proof In all the camps visited, and *during all discussions held with Rwandese* refugee leaders. UNHCR reports were Cited as sufficient reason to rule out any encouragement by these leaders of voluntary repatriation of the *refugees*. While the Commission was not in a position to determine quite clearly the extent *to which the UNHCR reports* had actually contributed in curbing voluntary repatriation among the ordinary refugees, it did, however, establish that the said reports had strengthened the hand of those leaders who had already been opposed to voluntary repatriation and who influence opinion in the camps. It must be stated that the second UNHCR representative showed a remarkable interest and co-operation *during* the visits and the preparation of the final report Upon request by the Commission, however, the ex-politicians in Bukavu presented a list of Rwandese persons that have been reportedly killed by the RPA in Rwanda, ;sad asked that this matter he taken up with *the present* authorities in Rwanda.

## 6.4 Eyewitness reports of systematic killings

Refugees who had opted for voluntary repatriation arc known to have returned to *tell* the stories of revenge killings by the RPA Although the commission cannot confirm the systematic authentication of these accounts by neutral sources, some of the witnesses quoted would seem to have no reason to blow any of such stories out of proportion. The Vice-Governor of South Kivu, for instance, told the story of four Catholic Sisters, two Hutu and two Tutsi, who had left for Rwanda a

couple of weeks before the arrival of the Commission, and of whom Only the two Tutsis had returned to Bukavu. only to report on the disappearance of their Hutu companions. This and other accounts had greatly contributed towards the stall in voluntary repatriation.

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## **6.5 Lack of confidence in the new Rwandese Government**

The departure of *the French forces from Rwanda* and the refugees lack of confidence in UNAMIR and *the Rwandese Government* have also enraged as some of the reasons contributing towards the present stall in the voluntary repatriation process, Even in South Kivu where the Interahamwe are not very *active* ordinary refugees are known to express distrust of the new Government, demanding either that security be guaranteed by a neutral body, or that their own leaders be seen to participate in the new Government as a prerequisite to their return.

The refugee reluctance to return to their homes is exacerbated by the present lack of certainty of property rights. On *the one hand* the pre" government has expressed the desire that refugees return to their homes yet the latter have no confidence in *the government* to guarantee them ownership of the properties that they left. If the present government is truly anxious to see the refugees return, then this matter should be given serious and prompt attention. *The situation* is further complicated by the government having already given some deserted properties to members of the victorious army. Few refugees could be expected to be willing to confront armed military personnel jiving in their former homes.

## **6.6 Rote of the political leaders**

Throughout its discussions with the refugee leadership at the camps as well as with *the military and political leaders*, the Commission noted a conscious attempt nrr the part of its interlocutors to deny any deliberate effort on their part to influence the attitudes of the refugees towards repatriation. At Mugunga camp, the camp Prefects denied having had any contacts with the political leaders over the two previous months, while at Katale, the camp leaders described their role in purely social and humanitarian terms. For their part, the politicians informed the Commission during discussions held at Bukavu of the difficulties they encountered as a result of the Zairian Government's hen on political activity by the refugees.

In spite of the above, claims, the Commission was able to *establish* through *both* format and informal contacts that members of the former Rwandese Government were in constant contact with the refugee leaders in the camps who, in turn, appeared to be ineffective control of public: opinion among the refugees. One of the possible consequences mentioned by the political leaders themselves) of *their transfer out of Goma would be the possibility* of easily convincing the refugee Population to return to Rwanda under risky conditions. *Furthermore, the* leaders continually referred to the fact that *the presence of* the majority of the Rwandese population outside the country was ample proof of the credibility and legitimacy of the leadership-in-exile, thus implying an interest in keeping the refugee population in neighbouring countries as a bargaining counter. It is worth noting *that while* the camp leaders consistently referred to refugee welfare problems in the camps, at no

point did the political and military leaders refer to the humanitarian predicament of the ordinary refugees in the camps as a key factor in considering a speedy resolution of *the crisis*. Those political and military leaders do *not live* in camps. They reportedly live in hotels in Goma and Bukavu under very good conditions. Desperation will develop when they run out of resources and that could develop some hidden Attitudes.

The long history of horrific acts of brutality by both sides in the Rwandan conflict appears to have set in motion a *dynamic of its own* Fear of what the other might do has consistently driven *each side to act preemptively* to remove the threat they believe they face. Though not wishing in any way to apologize for or excuse the Hutu atrocities in the most recent crisis, the Tutsi massacre of several hundred thousand Hutus in 1972 in Burundi and their *ruthlessness in the 1990 crisis* go a long way to explain the current level of fear in the minds of the refugee population. The refugee's army has been defeated by the very enemy they have feared for centuries and they naturally feel vulnerable. Whether it is rational or not the fear is very real in their minds. Of course, hatred and fear are close cousins when emotions are as strong as they are in Rwanda. This may **help to** understand the apparently unreasonable demands of leaders on both sides of the conflict. The international community ought to strive as its first priority in Rwanda, to help establish a balance of the vulnerability and fears present in the current situation. To this end, steps that increase the feelings of exposure by either side ought to be very carefully considered, as the very feeling of vulnerability will play into the hands of those with extreme solutions to their problems in mind. One should not forget the ease with which the Nazi regime manipulated fear of the Jews with such horrible results. One could understand the activities of the MRND in the same light. If this is understood, it follows that whether the former RGF is a credible force in the minds of the RPA is immaterial if their proximity reduces the feelings of vulnerability in the minds of the refugees.

## **6.7 Role of the military leaders**

The Commission was also able to establish the fact that the military hierarchy was working in a co-ordinated manner within the provinces of North and South Kivu. The insistence of the refugee leaders, particularly in the camps in North Kivu, to return to Rwanda only if their own army would be willing to return to protect them, and the established presence of both disarmed and armed military personnel in the camps, were further proof of the fact the RGF presence in North and South Kivu is of significant importance; to the refugee situation there. The role of the RGF leaders in opposing voluntary repatriation is very similar to that of the politicians. The presence of the top military officers at the meeting arranged by the commission to have discussions with the political leaders, and the presence of political leaders at the Commission's discussions with the military, are proof of the co-ordination that exists between these two categories of refugees of the common 80415 *being pursued, and* of the similarity of their influence: on the refugee population.

## **6.8 Role of Interahamwe**

As mentioned earlier in this report militant youth groups, believed to be made up mostly of Interahamwe militiamen strictly regulate public opinion among the

refugees, particularly in North Kivu, and are known to be to voluntary repatriation. Familiar with the Interahamwe's violent methods, the Commission is convinced that the only way of enabling the refugee population to make its own judgement on the opportuneness of voluntary repatriation would be to separate the Interahamwe from the rest of the population. Nonetheless, the fact that the Interahamwe and other militant groups have to use force to control public opinion in *this respect is proof of the fact that* there is a trend, however insignificant, towards voluntary repatriation. This trend is borne out by a UNHCR report to the commission on cases of refugees voluntarily leaving the camps to settle closer to the border with Rwanda as a possible prelude to voluntary repatriation. UNHCR and other humanitarian organization reports indicate that the militant actions of this group have constituted the single most effective factor in checking such voluntary *repatriation initiatives*.

## **6.9 Public pronouncements of the Rwandese Government**

It was clear from listening to the different categories of refugees that the Commission was able to meet that some public declarations of the new Rwandese Government have not helped to mobilize opinion in the camps in favour of voluntary repatriation. Many political tenders cited remarks made by government officials during the victory celebration gated by the Kigali Government, and which did not seem to have figured well for a speedy resumption of dialogue between the rival parties. Some of these declarations are being used by those opposed to voluntary repatriation to buttress their arguments. The refugees expressed the desire to communicate with the Kigali Government.

## **6.10 Role of the Zairian Government**

It was obvious in the Commission's discussions with the political and military leaders that in spite of some of the restrictive measures taken against them by the Zairian Government, they are fully confident of either Zaire's support, or, at the very least, its sympathy for whatever goals they may be seeking to achieve in Rwanda. The military leaders spoke with confidence, sometimes making thinly veiled threats against the new Rwandese Government. The Commission feels that with this attitude it is unlikely that the political and military leadership would be able to fully measure the urgency of the refugee situation, especially as it relates to *the sacrifices imposed* on the local Zairian population by the continued presence of the refugees.

*As an example, the Kigali Government announced their intention to try 30,000 persons to have participated in the genocides. Also, the five years transitional period allowed itself by BNGU before democratic elections is considered too long.*

## **7. KEY ISSUES AFFECTING SEPARATION, RELOCATION AND REPATRIATION**

In light of the above analysis of the causes for the slow-down in the voluntary repatriation process and based on its *belief that* any eventual separation, relocation and / or repatriation of *the refugees would have to be linked to the prospects* for an overall settlement of not only the refugee crisis but also the Rwandese crisis as a whole, the Commission examined some preliminary issues that would be crucial in

deciding on any of these three, or any other additional, options. These issues include i) assumptions on which the decision to separate or relocate was based; ii) the attitudes of the different parties in the present crisis with regard to, the options being referred to iii) political implications; iv) humanitarian implications; v) logistical implications; vi) security and operational implications; and (vii) financial implications.

## 7.1 Assumptions

The decision to separate the militant youth groups from the rest of the refugee population and to relocate the political leaders and the military further inland is predicated on a number of assumptions, among which is the fact that this will lead, sooner or later, to the voluntary repatriation of the vast majority of the refugees. While this is possible in principle, it should be pointed out that a number of imponderables remain. Firstly, the effective separation of the Interahamwe from the rest of the population *will be fraught with* difficulties such as the effective identification of the members of these groups, and the guarantees that there will be efficient policing to ensure that infiltrations will not occur afterwards. Without these positive identification and policing guarantees the separation of the militant groups from the population cannot be effective. It must be emphasized that no ordinary refugee will be willing to point out Interahamwe.

Secondly, for the relocation of the political leaders to serve as an effective deterrent to the present manipulation of the population, it will also be necessary to identify and penetrate parallel communication networks that presently link the leaders to the camps. Furthermore, it needs to be proven (and the Commission was not in a position to do so) that the degree of control that the leaders presently have over the population is weak enough for the vast majority of the refugee population to readily designate or accept new leaders.

Thirdly, and with regard to the relocation of the military the commission was able to establish that, while their presence in the Goma and Bukavu areas had an influence on the attitude of the refugee towards repatriation, this presence was not necessarily the most urgent influential factor in this regard. UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations actually confirmed that the most urgent danger came from Interahamwe. On the other hand, the soldiers that would easily be identified for relocation *would be* those who are now settled in the Mugunga, Pansi and Bulonge camps, whereas those soldiers - armed or unarmed - who presently have a direct influence on the refugee population, are those who no longer wear uniforms, and who have successfully mingled with the civilian population in virtually all the camps. Not only will this latter category not be identified, they will actually be entitled to UNHCR assistance. In light of the above, the Commission believes that the basic assumptions would have to be re-examined *before final action* is taken regarding separation of militant groups from the population and relocation of the politicians and the military. If this is not done the relocation exercise could end up actually strengthening, inadvertently, the assertions of the political leaders that they have no hand in the present stall in the voluntary repatriation process. It is however clear that, at best, these actions can only be undertaken in conjunction with other political initiatives aimed at reassuring the population from within Rwanda, and reaching agreement between the parties concerned on a negotiations agenda.

## **7.2 Attitudes toward separation, relocation and repatriation**

The importance of this factor lies in the fact that *no matter which of the above actions is emphasized, it will be necessary as a first step, to ensure, and eventually enlist, the collaboration of the key partners involved, including the categories of refugees to be moved.*

The partners whose attitudes towards these various options will be crucial in implementing the decisions to be made are the refugees themselves, the political leaders, the military, the militant extremist groups, the Zairian authorities, the Rwandese Government and the host population at the selected relocation sites. Following are the views of each of these categories, except for the Rwandese Government, as they emerged during their discussions with the Commission.

### **7.2.1 The refugees population**

As stated earlier due *to the* tense situation in most of the camps visited by the Commission, it was not possible to obtain directly the view of the ordinary refugees with regard to any of these options. Furthermore, the plan to separate the militiamen from the rest of the refugee population and to relocate political and military leaders, had not been discussed with the population prior to the arrival of the Commission. As far as voluntary repatriation *is* concerned however, the estimated 200,000 voluntary returnees to date', and the continued trickle of returnees into Rwanda in spite of threats from the militants and an extremely *effective* dissuasion mechanism *set up by the political leaders, are proof that there is a continued urge among the refugees to return.* This view is confirmed by UNHCR red from Mugunga camp in North Kivu. and by reports from other camps in South Kivu of increased inquiries of late by the refugee population on the possibilities of UNHCR assisting voluntary repatriation . it is, however, impossible to determine with any accuracy the motivations that lie at the root of the voluntary repatriation urge, or the conditions under which the vast majority of the refugee population would agree to voluntary repatriation Contacts; with one national NGO in Bukavu which is working closely with the refugees and ' UNHCR estimates as at end September. This figure: is *based on an actual head count of 120.000 and estimates of unco-ordinated border crossings.*

IRED/Grands Lacs, led by Mr. Zihindula Ngombe Ya Mwami P.O. Box 2375. Bukavu with Rwandese NGOs indicated that in *the camps in Bukavu, a significant percentage of the refugees is willing to return if some recognized Hutu leaders who are known not to have participated in the rent massacres return to Rwanda and invite them to do same.*

### **7.2.3 The politicians, military leaders, and Interahamwe**

Interahamwe the political leaders and the RGF military hierarchy in Zaire are implacably opposed to either their removal from the Goma and Bukavu area, the separation of the Interahamwe from the rest of the refugee population, the relocation of the military into more remote parts of the country, *or the reaction of the refugee population prior to an overall settlement of the conflict.* It is never premature at this stage for the Commission to determine exactly to what extent these groups would go to actually resist attempts to move them away from the

border area. This eventuality must however be seriously considered in any actual or contingency plans to be developed, so as to determine the human resources and the logistics required for the operation

Although there were some slight variations in the views expressed by the FAR hierarchy in Goma and in Bukavu, a common theme emerged from the Commission's discussions with the former Rwandese military authorities, namely, the strong urge and the intention to regain power in Kigali. They are therefore opposed to the kind of relocation that would jeopardize this goal. In Bukavu, the Commission learnt from local military sources who are in permanent contact with the local RGF hierarchy that the latter had attempted to initiate dialogue with the Zairian authorities aimed at obtaining relocation to enable regrouping and retraining in view of continuing the war. The Commission also noticed the remarkable confidence of the RGF hierarchy, particularly in the Goma area, that they could count on the Zairian support to regain power in Rwanda.

One important element worth noting with regard to the views of the military is the fact that throughout the Commission's visit, the only time someone among the refugees referred to the possibility of designating new leaders to negotiate with the RPF was in the military camp in Pansi. The Commission noted that this was the only camp visited where the Interahamwe was not yet active, and where the politicians could not easily impose their will. This fact only served to strengthen the Commission's belief that the separation of the militiamen and the politicians from the rest of the population is imperative. provided it is meticulous and is implemented in conjunction with other political initiatives.

#### **7.2.4 The Zairian authorities and the host population**

At the highest level of the State, and in accordance with the transitional constitution of the country which defines national security and issues of military importance as areas of shared responsibility between the Government and the Head of State, it can be considered that accordingly to this NGO, the names of former Prime Minister Dismas Nsengiyaremye and former Foreign Minister Mr James Gasana, now Ambassador of Rwanda to the USA, are being cited. The decision has been taken by the Zairian authorities to relocate the politicians and the military from the border towns. *It has also been* agreed to separate the militiamen and armed elements in the camps from the rest of the population. This was echoed by the provincial authorities who also laid emphasis on the sacrifices being *made by Zaire* as a whole and by the population of North and South Kivu in particular, and on the willingness of the population in the selected sites to help in cushioning the effect of the refugee influx in the country by accepting the transfer of some of the refugees to their respective provinces.

Following its visits to the proposed sites, the Commission was able to notice a reasonable level of tolerance on the part of the local population around the selected sites vis à-vis the refugees. - It can therefore be said that there is a reasonable chance the population would accept the arrival of Rwandese soldiers of the RGF without much trouble. However, it should be noted that the argument used at every location to convince the local population was that the international community (i.e. the United Nations) would rehabilitate abandoned and sometimes

decaying infrastructure at the sites to the refugees, from which the local population would benefit both during and after the relocation exercise. This of course implies that the failure to rehabilitate such infrastructure before or during the relocation could result in the hostility of *the host* population in the medium term. The degree of this conviction on the part of the local population can be fully appreciated by the fact that some sections of the local population that had been initially hostile to the idea of hosting Rwandese refugees prior to the arrival of the Commission were actually pleading with members of the Commission later on to select their location as one of those to receive refugees.

One noteworthy option put forth by the Vice-Governor of North Kivu of what should be done in case no immediate solution for relocation or repatriation could be found, was the setting up of a buffer zone within Rwanda under international control, where the refugees could be temporarily repatriated while awaiting a longer-term solution. Although members of the former Government seemed to rule out this possibility, the former RGF Head of Operations, General Gratien Kabirigi, clearly stated that the senior officers would prefer such a solution to being relocated further inside Zaire. However, the RPA having now been fully introduced in the south west of Rwanda, it will be extremely difficult to create such a buffer zone.

### **7.2.5 The United Nations**

Considering the terms of reference of the mission such as agreed during the visit to Zaire of the Secretary-General's Special Envoy for Rwanda, Ambassador Khan, it is clear that the United Nations was part of the decision to encourage voluntary repatriation by undertaking the relocation of political and Military leaders from the Zairian border and the separation of Interahamwe and other militant groups from the rest of the population. Nonetheless, issues of funding, agency responsibility and inter-agency harmonization are yet to be addressed, particularly between the United Nations Assistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) and UNHCR. Apart from disagreeing on the present *security situation* within Rwanda, it emerged from the commission discussions with UNHCR officials in Goma that, instead of *relocation*, UNHCR favours an approach that would seek to slowly undermine the credibility of the political leaders and the militant groups in the camps by creating an alternative leadership structure.

### **7.3 Political implications**

The political implications of the separation, relocation and repatriation exercise are varied. The most important, however, are the implications that the *exercise will* have on the prospects for a durable solution of the Rwandese problem. One accusation that kept recurring during the Commission's meetings with the different categories of refugees was that the international community had not fully understood the real political problem in Rwanda. They stressed the fact that it had taken 400 years of ethnic domination to bring the country to its present predicament, and that to focus on the return of the refugees and ignore the more fundamental problem that divided the Hutus and Tutsi in Rwanda would be to treat the symptoms and ignore the disease.

As the Commission found out, the level of anti-Tutsi feeling among representatives of the refugees in the Goma and ***Bukavu area is such that at no*** point during its discussions with these leaders was there a feeling ***of remorse for the recent genocidal acts in the*** country. This seems to imply that even among many people who might not have participated in the genocide, this feeling is equally strong, and will not necessarily go away even if the separation and relocation exercise was perfectly implemented and voluntary repatriation took place.

### **7.3.1 Political conditions for repatriation**

Since the main concern of the international community is to ensure that the refugees get back home voluntarily, their presence in or departure from Zaire has now become the main subject of envisaged negotiations. In this light the Commission sought and obtained from the political and military leaders a number of conditions which if met, should, in principle, enable the refugees to return home. Their conditions can be summarized as follows.

- a. Negotiations with the new Government;
- b. Revival of acceptable elements of the Arusha Accords;
- c. Power sharing;
- d. Security guarantees;
- e. Involvement of the exiled leadership in all negotiation process
- f. setting up of an international tribunal that will also deal with alleged massacres committed by RPP forces since 1990;
- g. The organization of early elections (and not after five years, as presently envisaged by the new Government);
- h. involvement of the United Nations in a form that is different from *UNAMIR* as it is presently structured, to facilitate *negotiations* between the new Government and the leadership-in-exile, and to provide security guarantees for the safe return of all refugees,
- h. Guarantees of re-possession by the refugees of their property presently taken over by either the Government or other individuals.

While it has been clear to the Commission that the political leaders see using the *absence* of the majority of the Rwandese population from the country as bargaining counter, it is equally reasonable to believe that *if all the refugees could* voluntarily return today, the new Government would have even less reason to negotiate. Since the emphasis on most of these conditions is on negotiation, the present focus on the separation of different groups of refugees and the relocation of others could be seen to confirm the persistent accusations of the political leaders *that the UN* is leaning towards the new Government in Kigali.

### **7-3.2 Political implications for Zaire**

In spite of the overall feeling of tolerance that the Commission was able to discern from its limited contacts with the host populations concerned, it also received letters of protest from human rights, political and other civil society pressure groups which will certainly turn the exercise into a political issue, something that will not necessarily be easy for the Government to manage in an election year.

It will also be required that Zaire show proof of political will *to* carry through the envisaged operations once they are designed and agreed upon. Given the present state of relations between the local authorities in the Goma and Bukavu areas, it will be necessary that written accords be signed and respected between all parties concerned, particularly with regard to policing the movement of certain categories of refugees to be relocated.

### 7.3.3 Political implications for the United Nations

Throughout its contacts with representatives of the refugees, the Commission noticed a deep level of distrust vis-à-vis the United Nations, particularly UNAMIR and its Canadian Commander at the time of the civil war, General Dallaire. It also registered their hope that *a different LIN structure, or a restructured UNAMIR, would* handle the security guarantees and the political *negotiation* component of the operation. This would certainly imply the involvement: of the Security Council.

On the other hand, the conditions and wishes of the representatives of the refugees would not necessarily be those of the new Government in Kigali. It would therefore also be the task of the United Nations, speaking with one voice, to reconcile the differences that could stand in *the way of a* negotiation agenda.

## 7.4 Humanitarian implications

### 7.4.1 Security

from observation during the Commission's visit to the various camps and the discussion with the refugees themselves it became clear that *the refugees consider* themselves to have moved to the safety of Zaire and are therefore secure against forced repatriation. The principle of non-forced repatriation as enshrined in Article 33 of the 1951 Convention obliges states not to take any action to expel or return a refugee a place where **his or her life or freedom** would be unnecessarily threatened. And according to the 1951 Statute of **the Office** of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, this involves a respect for their basic human rights as refugees. It *is therefore* unacceptable one 'refugee' should terrorize others and physically prevent the great majority of the common folk as it were from exercising their free will to repatriate or otherwise voluntarily. The establishment of appropriate security measures in the camps should be observed and not compromised. To this end, there is an urgent need for the deployment of the UN force to work alongside the *security forces of the host country, Zaire*. It is necessary, therefore, that the logistical requirements of Zaire be considered to give *the UN force an* enhanced participatory role in effecting appropriate security arrangements within the camps in the Kivu regions. Of equal importance is the indispensability of host country cooperation and support during and after the relocation of the *ex-military and* former government dignitaries to their new sites. This *is necessary because* there will be need for:

- a The *ex-military and former* dignitaries to move in relative *safety* and dignity {barring the force of law of the international tribunal
- b.. Security for the distribution of humanitarian aid to the displaced;
- d. Security for the overall operations, including all relief activities within and without the camp sites, even though there appears to be a strong law and order

*presence by the Zairian Governors in all the camp sites that were visited / inspected by the Commission.*

#### **7.4.2 Relief assistance**

Assistance in food and non-food items is essential to the category of refugees that will have to be relocated, in a manner similar to the distribution strategy of humanitarian assistance a, co-ordinated by UNHCR in the Goma/Bukavu region, since disturbances are often the result of refugees not receiving food.

#### **7.4.3 UNHCR**

It is noteworthy that UNHCR enjoys the confidence of the refugees. As such *UNHCR*, operating through implementing partners, is best suited to spearhead this operation *from* a humanitarian point of view in view of i) the UNHCR mandate, and ii) the hands-on experience of administering the Goma and Bukavu camps even under the most taxing of circumstances it is therefore anticipated that with the UNHCR factor, the "refugees" are more likely to co-operate with UNHCR than *with* any other UN aid agency. The deployment of a senior UN official to coordinate the matrix (if humanitarian activities would complement this endeavor).

#### **7.4.4 Strategic considerations**

It is noteworthy that the most attractive solution *Outwards* in enduring peace is voluntary repatriation for all refugees into Rwanda within the shortest possible time. Obviously, the present strategy is a medium-term strategy at best. Contemporaneously, there is an obvious need for negotiations to be conducted, hopefully by the now reconstituted UNAMIR, among all the parties involved in the Rwandese conflict, with a view to securing a more durable peace.

There is also a problem, it would appear, in the area of housing which could have been exacerbated by the houses destroyed during the war: and further aggravated by the influx of some Rwandese in generations of exile. It is essential that the present *Government* in Rwanda secure reasonable assistance for the construction of human settlements, using perhaps appropriate technology schemes, to address the sore problem of illicit occupancy by some Rwandese of other people's houses, which ***is a sure deterrent to voluntary repatriation.***

### **7.5 Assessment of sites visited**

#### **7.5.1 Introduction**

For the relocation of the erstwhile FAR currently living under difficult circumstances *in North and South Kivu*, the Government of Zaire proposed four sites, all of which are military installations.

The entire Commission visited the military camps of Kongolo (Shaba Region) and Lokando Maniema. For logistics reasons only, four out of the 14 members who went to Mbandaka visited the camp of Irebu (Equator Region). There was no

need to visit the military camp in Buta northern Zaire) for two main reasons that the Commission only *discovered on arrival in the town of Buta*:

- a. *The camp was occupied by the local police, for whom no alternative accommodation could be found;*
- b. *That camp could only house 120 people*  
*All three sites visited are rather far from North and South Kivu (from 700 km to 1,500 km away). Access to two of the sites (Lokando and Irebu for the near future would demand the use of river transport (very slow and potentially hazardous because of sand bars)*

It should be pointed out, though that Lokando would be accessible by band from Kindu airport if an existing 60 km road is repaired. The distance from North/ South Kivu to the Irebu / Mbandaka also needs to be emphasized.

Government of Zaire officials have suggested that all the military and their dependants that are to be transferred (estimated at 30,000 to 50,000) be distributed to as many MOMS as *is possible to reduce the political impact. This will argue for our using all three available military camps proposed.*

We could, however, press for the use of two instead of all three sites. *Arrangements for policing /securing the camps, administering them, as well as medical /water/other common facilities would be more cost effective if we could use two sites. Lokando for the 10,000 to 12,000 in the South Kivu area and Irebu for the estimated up to 18,000 military and their dependants in the Goma area.*

*As a negotiating position vis-à-vis the Zairian authorities, we could argue that we have gone into two out of the three potential regions that could hold the military group to repair/ revitalize those military installations. Furthermore, the local economy will receive an injection of external funds and other resources with the IN presence. Also, wherever possible, we could improve the local infrastructure with a relatively small outlay to the satisfaction of the local population (60 km road Kindu/Lokando to be repaired, airports at Kindu and Mbandaka already made of tarmac could be improved further if necessary; medical and potable water facilities for the ex-FAR and their families would be shared with the Zairians in the immediate environs of the camps). Finally, Zairian military personnel may have a role in the policing of the camps, alongside the UN military contingents.*

## **7.5.2 Kongolo - Shaba region**

### **7.5.2.1 Access**

*The military camp is part of the town of Kongolo which has 60,000 inhabitants. This means that on landing at the air strip of the town the military to be transferred would need to travel fewer than three kilometres to reach the camp. The air strip is, however, of laterite and there is some uncertainty as to its capacity to receive large planes. Improvements would have to be made to the runway of the air strip before it could take aircraft capable of carrying up to 500 people at a time.*

*currently it takes about a week to reach Bukavu or Lubumbashi by road. The train comes to the town once every three months, ore to a shortage fuel This means that If fuel were made available, the train could reach the town more often.*

#### **7.5-2-2 Current use of camps**

*The camp is currently occupied by 170 Zairian military with their families*

#### **7.5.2-3 State of the structured**

*Kongolo camp probably has more buildings than the other two camps of Lokando and Irebu. Single rooms with covered verandah alone amount to 1,040. to addition, there are many other structures, kitchens, officers' houses, dispensaries, maternity, a large school block, offices, four dining halls and other structures. Originally, the camp was planned for a battalion Unfortunately, many of the roofing sheets have disappeared about 40 Percent of the structures have no roofing sheets.*

The: camp is very spacious, and if selected there would be no difficulty in finding space to construct semi-permanent structures or to erect tents. ,

#### **7.5.2.4 Infrastructure**

water The camp is on the banks of the Zaire river. It would therefore be possible to pump the river water and treat it for human consumption. However, the local authorities stem to expect that the town's war system (for its 60,000 inhabitants) will be rehabilitated with the coming of the Rwandese military This will involve replacing much of the town's piping system, repairing the pumping machine (80 kW), and above all providing fuel and chemicals for running the system.

Electricity Since the camp is in the town it would be difficult to provide the Rwandese with a generator for lighting when the townsfolk stay in darkness at night. 'Me town had electricity once; to rehabilitate it would demand replacing most of the cables installed in the 1950 many stolen replacing the large generator which used to supply electricity to the town and, once again, providing, on a continuing basis, fuel to power the generator. We were informed that the 270 kW thermal plant the town had cannot be repaired, and that to provide adequate capacity the town net" a 500 kW capacity engine.

Health There is a large medical facility in the town. Only part of the buildings are in use If i we could reserve UN support to the community to only one sector, we would recommend the full rehabilitation and provision of medical equipment and other resources to the medical centre so that it could be used by both the Rwandese and the local people instead of outing a separate medical facility exclusively for the occupants of the military camp. Incidentally,, the camp is less than half a kilometre from the town hospital.

#### **7.5.2.5 Conclusions**

Logistically, Kongolo is, in our view, the most daunting of the three potential sites. furthermore, as it was reported earlier. on our arrival there was an orderly

demonstration at the airport (with placards) against any relocation to the region. The population only concurred with the delegation where it was explained to them that there would be potential benefits with Rwandese arrival in their town.

Despite all of the above, it should be noted that if it is decided to use this camp, it could host more than 15,000 without any difficulty.

### **7.5.3 Irebu camp - Equator region**

#### **7.5.3.1 Access**

Irebu can be reached entirely by the Zaire river. from Mbandaka over a distance of some 100 kilometres. That was the mode of transport the mission used on 11 October. The level of the water was very high and there was therefore not much danger of *sand bars*. We were informed that except for the peak of the dry season (June to August), the river can be navigated all year round by large barges that carry up to 500 people. We saw some of these large boats at the ports loading people and goods. (With a speed boat we did the journey in one and 3/4 hours.)

The Colonel in charge of the camp also advised us that there was once an air strip (1000 metres by 60 metres) but that it was now completely overgrown. Any repair of the air strip would require heavy machinery to be brought in from Mbandaka or elsewhere by boat.

#### **7.5.3.2 Current use**

The camp was originally built by the Belgians in the 1920s. Additional buildings were added to it up to the 1940s. It was closed in 1960 and reopened in 1979. since its reopening it has been used as a naval training centre. Three hundred and seventy-five military personnel. (men and women) currently live in the camp.

the buildings were generally in good condition, certainly the best maintained of the three camps we visited. Out of all the buildings, some 10 blocks (each divided into two) could be turned into dormitories to house up to 100 people each. In addition, there were some 54 two-room self-contained buildings meant for the more senior non-commissioned officers and almost all in use today.

#### **7.5.3.3 Shelter**

The Commission members estimated that up to 3,000 people could be housed in the existing buildings. Almost all the buildings had their roofs intact and were in reasonably good shape. Even though we are in the rainy season we did not see any leaks in the buildings which were not in use. The larger blocks which are mostly not being used, would need to have windows, doors and mosquito netting installed before people could be made to live in them. In several of the buildings the cement floor has to be re-done.

Naturally, to house more than 3,000 people additional structures (tents, semi-permanent buildings or other) would have to be erected. The camp is very

spacious and could carry the anticipated 10,000 to 15,000 people without any difficulty.

#### **7.5.3.4 Other facilities**

The camp is on the banks of the Zaire river. Since there is no large population group near the site there was no evidence of the river water being polluted. The preferred mode of potable water supply should be the OXFAM method of pumping river water into large metallic containers, filtering / purifying the water, and then providing public standpipes. We were also advised that there was a spring some five kilometres from the camp.

**Health** There is a functioning dispensary in the camp with three nurses, two of whom we met during our visit. The building in which they were operating could be used to set up a clinic, to include admission facilities. Latrines would have to be built, cooking facilities, Kitchens would have to be built.

#### **7.3.3.5 General considerations**

The local population is said to be very small, probably under 3,000. The nearest village is not within sight of the camp. The authorities at Mandaka were clearly enthusiastic about the military's coming (it is the President's home region). With the difficulty of access to the area there are no local population groups to put up any objection to their presence.

The camp however, is in a very pleasant setting, and with the right frame of mind the military, if taken there, could engage in sporting and large scale agricultural activities. The initial transfer of the military would be by air up to Mbandaka (good tarmac airport), to be followed by boat up to Irebu. The airstrip in Irebu would, however, have to be repaired for the purposes of rapid access (medical evacuation, for instance) or urgent resupply of drugs etc.).

#### **7.5.4 Lokando Maniema region**

##### **7.5.4.1 Access**

The Lokando military camp is 60 kilometres north of the town of Kindu, capital of the Maniema region. There is a dirt road from Kindu to Lokando, but it is, however, in a state of disrepair. There is no airstrip in the town nor in the camp; a helicopter could, however, land there. The usual way to reach Lokando is by boat. The regional military personnel advised the mission that the waterway (Zaire river) is navigable by large boats, except at the peak of the dry season when sand bars pose a danger to navigation and only canoes can be used.

##### **7.5.4.2 current use of camp**

The camp was built by the Belgium colonial power around 1936 for the training of local troops. That activity continued until 1963. From then until 1988, the 21st Infantry Battalion of independent Zaire occupied the camp. Subsequently, part of the Camp is being used by a Roman Catholic priest as a vocational training centre for

unemployed youth. Between the few trainees and *local gendarmerie* residing in the camp, only a small proportion of the buildings are occupied. Given the wet, humid climate and dense forest vegetation in the area, the unused buildings are deteriorating very rapidly.

The camp has 122 principal structures comprising 17 villas, 66 blocks each capable of housing 30 people, and a total of 39 other buildings which originally served administrative, storage and other purposes. If the latter category of buildings is also used for accommodation, the existing camp structures can house some 3,000 people.

But, as noted earlier, many of the buildings will need extensive repair of their walls and the fixing of windows and doors.

Furthermore as with the two other camps visited, additional structures and tents will have to be put up in order to accommodate more than 3,000 people.

#### **7.5-4.4 Services**

sanitation Each block has a *detached six-room Turkish flush latrine system*. *There is no running water in the camp, the system does not work. A new sanitation system would have to be developed for the camp.*

The camp is on the banks of the Zaire river. The river water can therefore be pumped, treated and distributed for human consumption. Electricity is not available either ***in the camps or in the adjoining village***. The village is rather small (fewer than 2,000 inhabitants) thus, although the camp is set at a *distance from the village (about one kilometre away)*, it would be good to make electricity available to the village if some of the former Rwandese military are relocated to the Lokando.

Any health facility to be established in the camp would have to be extended to the local community. In preparation for the Commission's arrival in the region, the local authorities had made a technical assessment of the *nature and cost of repairs of the 60 kilometre road*. The works would appear to require only a few weeks *and simple machinery*.

G . Maniema region is very isolated, and road access from the capital Kinshasa to other regions is very poor, contributing to the general depression and high cost of living in the area. Probably because of the perception of the local authorities of potential economic benefits of the relocation to their region, the enthusiasm demonstrated by the local population at all levels during the Commission's visit was remarkable.

### **7.6 Security and operational implications**

#### **7.6.1 Aim**

The aim of this section is to develop a workable concept of operations for the removal of identifiable members of the former RGF and political leaders of the Rwandan Government *in-exile to selected sites in Zaire by the end of January 1995.*

### 7.6.2 Limitations

Only sites agreed to by the Zairian authorities are considered. The political ramifications **will** be considered separately, however it is understood that the military actions proposed here will be subject to normal UN mandated limits.

### 7.6.3 Factors

Time. In order to encourage the refugee population to return to their homes in time to get crops in the ground for the next rains, it was determined that the removal of the two target groups should be completed no later than the end of January 1995. Although the sites themselves can be prepared quickly, access to *them* is severely limited, and the flow into each of *them* will be slow because of the lack of transportation infrastructure. It is anticipated that *approximately two months* would be required to complete the move from D-Day. **Unless this** can be shortened movement will have to begin by the end of November *to meet* the deadline.

Potential sites. The three sites chosen by the Zairian Government are difficult to get to and require significant improvements. In each case it would be necessary to reach *them* by air and in Lokandu and Irebu there would be an additional requirement to travel part of the distance by river. Establishing facilities and maintaining them will require substantial investment in infrastructure and lead time. The actual requirements will be determined in the logistics assessment.

RGF attitudes to resettlement Either the RGF will accept the idea of resettlement or they will not. If they will not, it will be necessary to force them to move. In this case, it will be necessary to put sufficient forces on the ground in the Kivu area in sufficient strength to forcibly disarm, collect, and escort the RGF to cantonment camps in this case, secrecy before the event would be essential to success, as early warning would permit former soldiers to melt away into the population or to arm themselves for resistance. Further, reluctant former army members will be *difficult* to recognize and to coerce onto whatever means of transport is chosen. Authority for this kind of operation would require permission to *use levels* of force far beyond those allowed by *Chapter VII*. Since it is unlikely that this would be allowed without considerable debate and since this debate would be very difficult *to keep secret, the best hope would be to let* the Zairian army conduct the initial part of the operation alone.

However, since their Prime Minister is on record as requesting the international community to undertake this task, some other force will be required. As there are approximately 30,000 soldiers and families spread about among various camps in the area, it is anticipated that a force of significant strength would be required in each of the *North and South Kivu sectors to blanket the area and to minimize the possibility of* resistance. Strict secrecy will be essential if resistance is anticipated. If the RGF accepts the idea of resettlement, that the UN could handle the voluntary disarming, collecting and moving of troops without problem.

Political leadership attitude *to resettlement*\_ Either the political leaders will go along with the idea nr. they will not. If they do, then the UN Problem is reduced to the administrative task of transporting them with their families to sites agreed to by them and by the host nation. The Leadership is unlikely to agree to go anywhere that does not allow them good communications with their people and with the outside world Given that none of the sites proposed by Zairian authorities offer this, then it is likely that they **will** resist. In this case the best hope of ensuring co-operation lies in allowing whatever force is tasked to gather them up at the same times as the members of the former RGF are collected.\_ There are approximately 1,200 persons to be fathered .!s category if family members are included. Identifying And gathering these people together against their will would require a polico-type force of several hundred, since the operation. would have to be carried out suddenly and quickly.

Refugee attitude to being separated from army and leadership. Either the refugees will go along with the idea of being separated from their leaders and their army or they will not. Given the level of fear induced by the recent Tutsi military success and the long history of oppression that they believe they have suffered, they are highly unlikely to accept the *departure of their* perceived protectors and leaders without resistance. If they resist, it may be necessary to use force to extract members of either or both categories of persons discussed here. This would require a large number of troops in a complex operation and would be likely to attract attention of the world press and the censure of liberal governments. Again, the best hope of success would lie in quick and decisive action It should be noted that any direct involvement by the UN in this operation would **certalm. cad** to aggravation of the already cynical attitude expressed towards them by Rwandan Hutus. if the move is unpopular and the UN is blamed for it, then there will be scant hope of UN involvement in negotiating the return of the remaining refugees to their homes. In fact, if word gets out that the UN is even considering forcing the issue in this way, it could lead to open hostility. Given the sense of vulnerability among *the refugee* population and the presence of rabid militias in the camps, the security problems that this operation is aimed *at* would be very probably exacerbated by rumours of this plan. The presence of a strong security force in the camps to protect UN agencies and NGOs will be essential both before and after the operation. If the above reasoning is correct, a UN force would not be the best for the job. It might therefore fall to another form of organized force.

Possible future actions. At the moment, both the *leadership of the* former RGF and political leaders in *exile* express the desire to return to Rwanda by force if necessary. They do not have the military strength to do so at the moment but appear willing to *take the time* to train and equip themselves over whatever time it may take. If the former RGF is removed to remote sites they may be tempted to use the opportunity to train. Their activities will be of great interest to the present Government in Rwanda. Since Zaire has an interest in seeing the refugee home as quickly as possible, they would not have the credibility to monitor the former **RCF** or the leadership in exile to ensure that they do not spend their time preparing an invasion of Rwanda. A credible neutral force under UN authority would be required to reassure the present Rwandan Government that A clandestine training programme was not

being conducted. Since UNAMIR is not credible in the eyes of the former RGF, some other UN force will need to be mandated to monitor former RGF. There are three sites that have been proposed by the Zairian Government to receive the former RGF: Irebu, Lokandu and Kongolo. The logistical implications of each are considered elsewhere. Each one is isolated and would be relatively easy to guard once the troops of the former RGF have been moved in order to get them there, a guarded transport system will have to be set up. Since the means of transport will have to come from UN sources, UN troops could be used to carry out guard tasks. The Zairian authorities favour using all three camps to reduce the political tension that a large force in one place could pose. This would place approximately 10,000 former RGF soldiers and dependants in each site. If all three sites are used; then a battalion-sized force would be required to each one to allow for rotation of troops and adequate rest in each case, the guards to escort former RGF troops to their destinations could be provided from the battalion tasked to guard the final site. It is anticipated that a company-sized force could handle each pipeline from start to finish if reliable transport is provided to keep troops moving through.

Monitoring political leaders. Several sites have been chosen to receive political leaders in exile. Mbandaka, the only site visited, does not have the capacity to accommodate all of the persons expected. Separating the leaders from each other in different towns would reduce the possibility of them co-ordinating a military plot to invade Rwanda, however it would increase the security requirement. It is suggested that further investigation of suitable venues is required, as is clarification of the status of the guests. If they are to be removed from the Kivu area by force then they must be held in their new locations by force as well. This may require a form of security by the host country. It must then be determined whether the guests are to be held incommunicado or not. If they are, then nothing needs to be done to prepare the sites. If they are not, then perhaps the best destination for them would be Kinshasa since that is the only site with good communications in the country. The actual number of troops required for guard duty cannot be determined until the final choice of accommodation sites has been made. If, however, several countries/ towns are to be chosen, then the host countries will be responsible for monitoring the activities of the guests adequately. It is known from comments made in the camps that the Hutu population of Rwanda does not trust some specific countries. Since both the host nation and the target population are French speaking, efforts must be made to find French-speaking troops to fulfil the guard and monitor duties discussed above. A list of potential donor countries should be developed by UNHQ.

#### **7.6.4. Discussion of factors**

The political implications for the UN of forcibly separating the former RGF and political leaders from the refugee population in the Kivu area are staggering. Yet, if they are to be removed against their will then there would appear to be a limited choice of methods: either deception or force. Deception at this level, given the nature and the number of agencies and forces involved, is not feasible. Therefore, force will probably be necessary to remove the political leaders and former RGF members.

The actual removal could be done by a coalition force of some kind, but the monitoring and transport would require UN forces and therefore will implicate the IIN in whatever action will be taken. Given the levels of fear present in the camps at the moment and the sources of that fear, this venture is considered to be highly dubious. However, it could conceivably be carried out successfully if, and only if, decisive action is allowed. Secrecy will be absolutely necessary before D-day.

The deployment of a guard force and the issuing of a UN mandate could not be done in strict secrecy, therefore the exercise would be very messy and liable to generate significant casualties if resistance is encountered. *Given* the level of fear and the irrationality it seems to engender among Rwandese, resistance must be anticipated, and *therefore a great* deal of care must be exercised in *undertaking* this mission in order to avoid both casualties and controversy.

The military options are limited to the selection of sites and the conduct of the initial removal. The site selection being a political matter, and since the Zairian authorities have already selected **these sites**, construction of the camps and setting up the mandate of the UN force should begin as soon as the decision to go ahead has been taken. Given the poor communications and the *state of the* national infrastructure in the operational areas, it will probably take at least three months to complete preparations at the reception sites once a budget has been approved. Troops should be on the ground in the sites at least one week before *guests arrive*. The total UN troop requirement for the guard sites assuming resistance is encountered is assessed as follows:

- a. Lokandu site. 1 Battalion
- b. Irebu site: 1 Battalion
- c. Kongolo site: 1 Battalion
- d. VIP guards: provided by local authorities
- e. Existing camp sites in Kivu province at Mugunga, Pansi and Katale will also require: 1 Battalion size/ location if political persuasion works, then the requirements can be reduced to one company in each location augmented by several UNMO detachments.

Whichever deployment option we are forced into, it will be necessary to establish a communications network *to co-ordinate the execution of the* plan. There is no communications infrastructure in Zaire.

### 7.6.5 Recommendations

It is recommended that the consequences of the action proposed here be given very careful consideration before it is adopted. It is the considered opinion of the Commission **members** that separating the political leadership and the former *RGF* from the refugee population in *the Kivu* are could be both hazardous to the future reputation of the UN and unlikely to lead to the desired immediate result. The operational difficulties alone of forcibly separating and detaining the numbers of persons envisaged here make this a very daunting task. If, however, it is decided to proceed with this operation, secrecy must be strict and immediate. *The* likelihood of a leak is very high given the need to canvass nations for contributions and the need for debate in the Security Council prior to establishing a mandate. It is recommended

that in camera discussions be held with potential donor nations before bringing the matter up for open debate.

## **SECURITY IN THE CAMPS**

while contemplating the military plan set out below it may be necessary to consider simply putting an overwhelming multinational security force (complete commando brigade) in the existing camps to ensure law and order, and as a deterrent to the armed elements. Should the presence of this force achieve the desired result. The detail plan outlined below may not have to be implemented.

It is recommended *that* other options, such as intensification of diplomatic pressures on the refugee leaders and the current Rwandan Government, be explored before committing a force to this action. However, since the commission was specifically created to formulate a plan for the separation and relocation, a proposed plan has been set below.

## **8. OUTLINE PLAN**

### **8.1 General**

The joint UN/ Zairian Commission undertook a thorough reconnaissance of refugee camps in the North and South Kivu provinces of Zaire. The Commission also visited sites proposed by the Zairian Government in Kongolo (Shaba province), Itkando (Marfiema province), and Irebu (Equator province). During all the visits, the Commission met and held discussions with Zairian Government and military authorities and representatives (if UNHCR ICRC. NGOc. refugee leader. and military leaders of the former Rwandese Government Forces (RG F At the end of the visits and discussions, it was possible to arrive at various courses open to the C.. commission or option plans with specific aims on the mission assigned to us. The various factors bearing on the situation have been very carefully considered. Whatever plan is proposed here also takes cognizance of the fact that the current Rwandese Government positively and transparently pursues reconciliation with a guarantee of security and return of property to rightful owners while the trial of those accused of genocide is brought to a speedy conclusion

### **8.2 Aim**

THE AIM OF THE COMMISSION IS TO STUDY CAREFULLY THE RWANDESE REFUGEE SITUATION IN NORTH AND SOUTH KIVU PROVINCES OF ZAIRE. WITH THE VIEW TO IDENTIFYING POLITICAL LEADERS AND THE MEMBERS OF THE FORMER RWANDESE GOVERNMENT FORCES AND FAMILIES FOR RELOCATION BEARING IN MIND THE COSTS AND LOGISTICS REQUIREMENTS.

### 8.3 Options one.

A United Nations force operating under Chapter VII and under a different mandate from that of UNAMIR.,

- a. **Advantages** The advantages of this option are
  - i. it will have a mandate that will enable it to face any eventualities;
  - ii. A force under a UN banner will be considered neutral and therefore acceptable.
- b. **Disadvantages**. The disadvantages are:
  - i. Owing to its very nature, the UN force will take sometime to assemble and vital time will be lost
  - ii. Owing to national directives, even though such a force will operate under Chapter VII, there is bound to be hesitation when action has to be taken.
  - iii. it is not certain whether the Zairian Government will accept Chapter VII in this operation.

### 8.4. option two

A multinational coalition force led by a country with strong armed forces and credible resources

- a. **Advantages**. The advantages are.
  - i. Speed in deployment;
  - ii. Decisive in nature;
  - iii. Total commitment.
- b. **The disadvantages** of this option are:
  - i. If the operation should go wrong, the blame is borne only by that country that leads the coalition.
  - ii. The difficulty in getting a nation to head such a force

### 8.5 Conclusions on options


The two options presented could achieve: the aim. However, option two is most likely to achieve the desired goal with minimum delay in order to get the refugee problem sorted out as quickly as possible.

### 8.6 Recommendation

The commission assessed option two as the one that has a greater degree of success and has the capabilities of bringing the situation under control with minimum delay.

## 8.7 Force level

Judging from the threat analysis in the existing camps and the need to provide security at the new camp sites, a force level of a commando brigade group and an infantry brigade will be required to undertake the task. This is because of the terrain and the consequent separation of forces and also because of the need to have built-in reserves for rest and the rotation of troops. It should be noted at this point that it is anticipated that both brigades could be quickly thinned out once the RGF had been placed in cantonments. This force will have, in addition, Zairian security forces to undertake some Mice duties. The structure of such a force will be such that it has control over the existing and the new camp sites with emphasis on security of the refugees.



## 8.8 Concept of Operation

The Concept of the coalition force will be that of deployment of commando units in the existing camps and the infantry units in the new sites, in such a manner as to isolate the RGF, political and militia elements from the ordinary refugees and to ensure security by undertaking the tasks detailed in the outline plan.

## 8-9 Threat

The main threat in the existing camps as stated in the analysis of the various groups is that of the militia and to some extent the militant elements of the RGF. Also, the Presidential guard location is unclear, it is believed to be secretly located with the full complement of weapons and equipment.

## 8.10 Employment

The commando battalions should be organized into Battalion Headquarters and three commando task-organized companies which will sort out the RGF for relocation in the new camps and the militia to be put under control in police concentration centres or under Zairian

military authority. The infantry battalions would be in charge of security at the new sites.

### **8.11 Engineer Regiment**

This unit should be organized into Regimental Headquarters and its inherent construction, plant and technical squadrons, and should have sufficient resources to undertake a variety of reconstruction and utility tasks. This regiment must be capable within its own organization to undertake the following tasks:

- a. Repair and maintenance of existing air fields;
- b. Expansion of existing camp sites;
- c. Repairing and constructing bridges up to medium and heavy class,
- d. Repairing existing roads;
- e. Providing potable water to the force and the refugees, even though UNHCR may be in position to undertake this task;
- f. Repairing existing buildings and construction of new ones;
- g. Efficient in river transportation and watermanship; and
- h. Explosive ordinance disposal in the existing refugee camps.

### **8.12 Air transport squadron**

The transport squadron attached to the force must be military, with its own inherent capabilities of transport, air recce and air traffic control. The ground forces could provide air field security. Failing to get a typical air transport squadron, a civilian contractor maybe assigned, but this second option may result in inefficiency as experienced elsewhere. It must be borne in mind that speed of execution is of the essence. The air squadron will undertake the following tasks:

- a. Transportation of the refugees;
- b. Resupply of troops and refugees;
- c. Air reconnaissance;
- d. Casualty evacuation;
- e. Transportation of reserve or rapid reaction teams; and
- f. Liaison between Zairian Government and other agencies

### **8.13. Medical support unit**

The medical support unit should be of an expanded field medical company, with the capability of surgery and handling of tropical diseases. Among other health needs, the medical company will undertake the following:

- a. Co-ordination of medical evacuation;
- b. Supervision of sanitation in the camps;
- c. Minor and major surgery to the troops and refugees;
- d. Medical support to the local population;
- e. Ambulance service; and
- f. Put in place a 40-bed ward facility.

### **8.13.1 logistics battalion**

The logistics battalion will initially be organized with two companies deployed, one in the North and South Kivu area and the other one supporting the new sites,. Once the relocation is completed then the battalion will be reduced to one company. and eventually the company could be replaced by standing contracts. These companies must be equipped m carry out the following tasks:

- a. Overland transportation of re-supply items from airfields and river banks to the troops and refugees at the various camp sites;
- b. Stockpiling and distribution of ration, water, petrol oil and lubricants (POI.) and spare parts to unit locations;
- c. Transportation of refugees overland- and
- d. Repair and recovery - 2" and 3' line.

### **8.13.2 Communication squadron**

There is virtually no existing telecommunication system in the areas where the new camps are to he sited. therefore there is need for the force in have its own inherent communication system to undertake the following'

- a. VHF and HF communication network within and outside the camps;
- b. Facsimile;
- c. Telephone - INMARSAT and cellular;
- d. Air despatch services;
- e. Postal services to troops and refugees; and
- f. Radio broadcast facility.

### **8,13.3 Movement control unit**

Owing to the complex nature of the various types of transportation involved in the operation, there is need to have a movement control unit to co-ordinate it. There will be land, sea end air transportation.

## **9. Logistical implications**

The deliberations of the Commission have provided two main options to be analysed logistically - either the relocation would he voluntary or involuntary. Both options would consist of moving 30,000 persons simultaneously to three new sites - Kongolo,, Lôkandu and Irebu - cach with a forecast of 10,000 persons. Other options can also be considered, using varying quantities of transportation resources.

The following assumptions were made:

- a. The Kongolo airport would be improved to receivc C-130 aircraft after a technical assessment has been completed;

- b. Communications would be made available at all sites (two airports of embarkation and three airports of disembarkation);
- c. Transition camps would be set up in Kindu and Mbandaka (48-hour transition camps) and in Coma and Bukavu (less than 12 hours);
- d. All military persons and their families in Bukavu would be moved to Kongolo, whereas those in Goma would be moved equally to Lokandu and Irebu;
- e. The political leaders with their families (1,200) would be moved to a site selected by the Zairian authorities in the western part of the country. Mbandaka is used for the purpose of this estimate;
- f. All construction costs estimated by the Zairian engineer advisor are accurate within Zaire and consider complete refurbishment of all sites. However, UNHCR has a simplified method of refurbishing such camps. The total cost is still being assessed;
- g. All movements to Lokandu and Irebu would be by boats initially; and
- h. Zairian forces would ensure the security at the current camps in North and South Kivu, as well as identifying and lathering the political leaders, the military forces and their families.

and Mariame for each of one site security a none with of a requacum in move the persons initially by road transport buses and trucks, from their current sites to the airports of embarkation (Apoe) and in the case of Kongolo from the airport of disembarkation (Apod) to the new site. The mode of transport from Apoe to Apod would be by C-130 whereas from the Apod in Kindu and Mbandaka to the new sites the mode of transportation would be by boat. The detailed requirements and costs are attached as Tables 4 and 5;

## 9.1 The logistics implications related to protection

The cost related to the protection factor of this operation are attached as Table 1. The logistics implications related to this factor include

- a. The military forces required to be deployed in the North and South Kivu areas to perform the task of separating the political leaders and the military forces from the ordinary refugees will be provided by a combined force of a coalition-led force, and will be supported logistically by the UN. These costs will include the deployment and sustainment costs of all military forces deployed in these areas for these tasks. The sites that must be considered include at least the camps of Mugunga-I (100), Pansi (4,000) and Bulonge (6,000), and any other camps that may have ex-military personnel (up to 9,000), as well as the locations in North and South Kivu of the political leaders (1,200), which must be confirmed;
- b. The military forces required during the movement phase of this operation to ensure the security of the Zairian population, the persons (political leaders and military) being moved, would be provided by multinational or

coalition-led forces. These requirements must be considered under two different conditions whether the refugees being moved are doing so voluntarily (no protection requirement) or involuntarily (four companies at transition camps and regards on transportation modes); and

- e. The military forces required to provide the security at the relocation sites for both the refugees and the Zairian local population would be provided by multinational or coalition-led forces. These costs would include both the cost of deploying these solutions and their sustainment. Also, the living conditions, willingness of the refugees to be in these new camps, and the anticipated duration of the task could significantly affect the cost of this factor (16 Military Observers if voluntary of four infantry battalions if involuntary).

## 9.2 Movement implications

The amount of time required to move the political leaders and military personnel by air are attached as Tables 2 and 3. The costs related to moving the selected persons to the new sites are attached as Tables 4 and 5. The movement implications include:

- a. The actual mode of transportation will consist of a combination of air, road, and maritime for each of the sites selected. There will be a requirement to move the persons initially by road transport, buses and trucks, from their current sites to the airports of embarkation (Apoe) and in the case of Kongolo from the airport of disembarkation (Apod) to the new site. The mode of transport from Apoc to Apod would be by C-130 whereas from the Apod in Kindu and Mbandaka to the new sites the mode of transportation would be by boat. The detailed requirements and costs are attached as Tables 4 and i;
- b. the types and quantities of resources available; within Zaire such as vehicles, boats or planes must be determined, as well as the rental / purchase costs. The remainder of the required resources will have to be identified in accordance with the specific limitations of each site selected. The duration of these requirements for the movement and for the sustainment portion must be determined; and
- c. The costs related to preparing or improving the embarkation and disembarkation areas depend on the available mode of transport. The known requirements at this time are:
  - i. **Landing strips.** (none of these has any aviation fuel available on site):
    - (1) Goma - very good conditions;
    - (2) Bukavu - can take a C-130 to be improved for larger aircraft with no night facilities;

- (3) Kongolo - CN-235 (max. 14 tons) laterite runway, with no tower, must be improved for larger aircraft;
- (4) Kindu - can take a C-130 and has a tower with landing lights;
- (5) Lokandu - no facility;
- (6) Buta - can take a C-130 but the runway is in bad condition (broken asphalt).
- (7) Mbandaka - can take a C-130 and has a tower with landing lights; and
- (8) Trebu - has an abandoned dirt runway covered by vegetation.

ii. **Roads** Most roads in Zaire are very difficult. and the time required to cover the distances between the current refugee camps and the proposal sites range from a minimum of four days to a few weeks. The following road conditions must be considered for this operation:

- (1) Bukavu - roads are in had condition, particularly along Lake Kivu;
- (2) Kindu to Lokandu - 60 ken of mad repairs are required including 12 bridges; and
- (3) Mbandaka to Irebu - there is a road that covers the first 70 km but there is no road for the last 62 km (100 km by the river).

iii. **Waterways.** Travelling on water is a major mode of travel in ?sire, though very slow and limited for acce m during dry scasons and in the nurbcr of people that can be moved simultaneously. The following proposed sites can only be reached by river from the nearest city that has an airport, at this time:

- (1) Lokandu to Kindu is 60 km;
- (2) Irebu to Mbandaka is 100 km.

### 9.3 Site preparation

The site preparation costs include the deploymem of the-UN/ multinational / coalition-led forces required to ensure the security of the sites as well as the build-up of the administrative requirements; the details of these costs are attached as Tables 6, 7, 8 and 9. The two options are considered in the case of the site preparation: voluntary and involuntary. The site Preparation implications include:

- a. The costs related to renovating completely or simply doing basic repairs to the current infrastructures;
- b. The costs related to building new inf astructures;
- c. The time required to deploy both the security forces as well as the administrative resources;

- d. The purchase / rental costs and the transportation costs of the plant equipment required to perform all the construction engineering tasks as there is none of this equipment available locally;
- e. The defensive stores requirements in the case of an involuntary relocation;
- f. The acquisition and transportation costs of all the materiel required, as there is practically no materiel available locally; and
- g. The costs related to improve, repair and replace/build local facilities such as power and water plants, local roads and other resources.

#### **9.4 Site sustainment**

The site sustainment costs will vary depending on whether the relocation is voluntary (minimum security is required) or involuntary (where four infantry battalions must also be sustained); these are attached as Table 10. The site sustainment Implications include

- a. Which organization, depending on the status decided on, will have the responsibility for sustaining the relocated political leaders, the military personnel and their families:
- b. The level of support expected to sustain the relocated elements and
- c. The actual Costs of sustaining the relocated elements.

#### **9.5 Financial implications**

The summary of the total costs estimated in accordance with the two options considered, voluntary or involuntary, are attached as Table 11.

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE I**

**LIST OF PERSONS MET**

- 1 Acting Prime Minister of Zaire (27-09-94)
- 2 Gomra UNHCR (initial meeting,) (29-09-94)
- 3 UNHCR (second meeting) (30-09-94)
- 4 Acting Governor of North Kivu (30-09-94)
- 5 Mugunga camp leaders (30-09-94)
- 6 Military leaders of the ex-RGF (30-09-94)
- 7 Kibale camp leaders (01-10-94)
- 8 Military leaders of the ex-RGF (01-10-94)
- 9 Inera camp leaders (02-10-94)
- 10 Vice-Governor of South Kivu (02-10-94)
- 11 Bukavu/Uvira UNHCR (02-10-94)
- 12 Prime Minister's Head of Mission (02-10-94)
- 13 Bukavu/Uvira NGOs (02-10-94)
- 14 Pansi military camp leader (03-10-94)
- 15 Rwinkese political leaders (03-10-94)
- 16 ICRC representative (04-10-94)
- 17 Ex-RGF South Kivu military leader (04-10-94)

**JOINT ZAIRE/ UN CO MISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDESE REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
  
LOGISTICAL IMPLICATIONS**

The following attached tables summarize the logistical implications of this operation:

- 1 Protection logistics implications costs
- 2 Airlift requirements with three x C-130
- 3 Airlift requirements with six x C-30
- 4 Transportation costs with three z C-130
- 5 Transportation costs with six x C-130
- 6 Site preparation costs - Kongolo
- 7 Site preparation costs - Lokando
- 8 Site preparation costs - Mbandaka
- 9 Site preparation costs - Irebu
- 10 Site sustenance costs - all sites
- 11 It Summary table of all costs

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REGUGEEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE**

**SCHEDULE AND ITINERARY**

1. The mission was conducted during the period of 26 September to 13 October 1994. The detailed itinerary was as follows:

- a. 26 September, 1800 to 2030 hrs - The first meeting conducted with all the members listed in paragraph 2 reviewed-and confirmed the terms of reference which would guide the mission for its tasks. These are attached as Appendix 1;
- b. 27 September, 0900 to 1030 hrs - The members were received by Mr. Gustave Malumba Mbangula, Vice-Prime Minister. Minister of the Interior and Acting Prime Minister at the Ministry of the Interior. The points and resolutions discussed are attached as Appendix 2;
- c. 28 September - During this third day. various administrative details were completed prior to starting the visit. The sequence of activities for this day are listed at Appendix 3;
- d. 29 September - The Commission left Kinshasa [or Go= by UN aircraft. In Goma, the UN members of the team met with the Goma regional representatives from UNHCR and discussed a Possible itinerary for the next two days. The information obtained is at Appendix 4;
- e. 30 September - The fifth day of the Commission consisted of a series of visits and meetings. These were:
  - i. 0830 hrs - UNHCR Information meeting on the current situation within the Rwandan refugee camps within the area of North Kivu (Appendix 5);
  - ii. 1100 hrs - Meeting with the Acting Governor of North Kivu (Appendix 6);
  - iii. 1430 hrs - Visit of the Mugunga camp and meeting with some of the camp leaders (Appendix 7); and
  - iv. 1830 hrs - Meeting with military leaders of the ex-RGF (Appendix 8),

- f. 1 October -
  - i. The Commission members spent the morning waiting to travel to the Kabale refugee camp. They left at 1200 hrs and met the Kabale camp representatives in an hotel in Kiwanja 10 kms north of Kabale between 1400 and 1800 hrs The details of this meeting are in Appendix 9;
  - ii. A sub-commission meeting was held with the military leaders at 1930 hrs, during which a List of the military components with their families for the North Kivu area was submitted (Appendix 10).
- g. 2 October - During this day the Commission travelled to Bukavu and held the following meetings / visits:
  - i. Visit of the Inera refugee camp at 1020 hrs (Appendix 11);
  - ü. Meeting with the Vice-Governor of South Kivu at 1200 hrs (Appendix 12);
  - iii. Meeting with the UN 1 iCR Bukavu/ Uvira representatives at 1343 hrs, during, which the Commission's Zairian military members went to meet the local Zairian military commander (Appendix 13)
  - iv. Lunch at Mr. Mutiri-wa-Bashara's residence (1430 hrs), where the Commission members received 'inside' information obtained by the Commission's Zairian military members from the local Zairian military commander (Appendix 14). Brig Cien Anyidoho left the area for Kigali, Rwanda at 1530 hrs to submit an interim report to the SRSG UNAMIR; and
  - v. Meeting with the Bukavu /Uvira NGO representatives at 1700 hrs (Appendix 15).
- h. 3 (October)-
  - i. The Commission members travelled to the Pansi Rwandese military camp and met with the military leaders of the camp (Appendix 16). Mr. leddo Van Drunen left the Commission to return to Geneva;
  - ü. The Commission held a meeting with the representatives of the Rwandese political leaders in the Bukavu area at. 1700 hrs (Appendix 17)

i. 4 October -

- i. Some of the Commission members met with an ICRC representative at 1530 hrs to discuss the status of the Rwandese ex-military currently in Zaire (Appendix 18);
- ii. The Commission met with the South Kivu military [leader. at](#) 1B00 hrs (Appendix 19).

Table 1

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE**

**PROTECTION LOGISTICS IMPLICATION COSTS**

SITES/MODE OF TRANSPORT	VOLUNTARY		INVOLUNTARY	
	RESOURCES PERSONS	COSTS/MONTH US \$K-"	RESOURCES PERSONS	COSTSI MONTH US SK
Current sites (North and South Kivu)	500	1,500	2,400	7,200
Transport (North Kivu)	0	0	20	60
Transport (.South Kivu)	0 .	0	20	60
Transport (Air - Goma to Kindu)	0	0	4	
Transport (Air - Goma to Mbandaka)	0	Q		
Transport (Air - Bukavu to Kongolo)		0		
Transit site Goma	0	0	120	360
Transit site (Bukavu)	0	0	120	360
Transit site (Kindu)	0	0	120	360
Transit Site (Mbandaka)	0	0	120	360
Transport (road - Kindu)	0	0	10	30
Transport road - Kindu to Lokandu)	0	0	20	60
Transport (road - Mbandaka)	0	0	10	30
Transport (boat - Mbandaka to Irebu)	0	0	20	60
Transport (road - Kongolo)	0	0	10	30
New sites (political leaders)			0	0

- New site (Lokandu)			1200 800	3,600 2,400
New site (Irebu)	12	42	1200 800	3,600 2,400
New site (Kongolo)	12	42	1200 800	3,600 2,400
Total costs/mornth	536	1,626	6,602	19,806
Total costs/6 months (first 6 months)	536	9,756	6,602	118,836
Total costs/6 months (after first 6 months)	36	126	2,400	43,200

1. \$3,000.00 is the estimated cost of one military person not on - includes: monthly contribution paid to the country, deployment/ redeployment sustainment (food, water), other costs (fuel, spare parts, R & R, medical, dental ...)
2. It is estimated that those in receipt of MSA will cost monthly \$3,500.00 (MSA + transport)
3. The security elements included in the current sites in North and South Kivu are estimated, for a period of less than six-month duration, at:
  - a. three commando battalions at 600 personnel each;
  - b. a communications and formation headquarters of 150 personnel;
  - c. two engineer troops -150 personnel;
  - d. two support organizations including medical and logistics elements - 200 personnel;
  - e. two air elements - 150 personnel; and
  - f. total - 2,450.
4. In the case of a voluntary movement, the military component would require approximately 500 personnel (headquarters, communications, engineers, medical, logistics and air functions).
5. The security elements required for each new site include:
  - a. an infantry battalion - 800 Personnel for the duration including additional communications, medical, logistics and air elements; and
  - b. an engineer squadron - 400 personnel for the initial construction period.

Table 2

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWADAN REFUGEE CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
AIRLIFT REQUIEMENT (WITH THREE X C-130)**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>BUKAVU to KONGOLO</b>	<b>GOMA to KINDU</b>	<b>GOMA to MBANDAKA</b>
Pens to move	10,000	10,000	11,200
Req'd chawks	167	167	187
Total chawks	210		235
Loading time	1		1
Flying time	1		3
Unloading time	1		1
Flying time	3		3
Total time	6	4	8
Chawks/day/ plane	2	3	1
Days req'd for 1 X C-130	105	70	235
Days req'd with reassigned ' C=130's	105	70	70 35 (X 2 = 70) 32 (X 3 = 96) Total - 137 days/20 weeks

1. 60 pax/plane with personnel belongings.
2. 80 per cent availability of Aircraft flying time.
3. Bukavu to Kongolo return flying time includes refuelling in Goma.
4. Chawks/day is based on 12 hours daylight flying time.

Table 3

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
AIRLIFT REQUIREMENTS (WITH SIX C-130)**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>BUKAVU to KONGOLO</b>	<b>GOMA to KINDU</b>	<b>(GOMA so MBANDAKA)</b>
Pers to move _	10,000	10,000	11,200
Req'd chawks	167	167	187
Total chawks	210	210	233
Loading time	1	1	1
Flying time	1	1	3
Unloading time	1	1	1
Flying time	3	1	3
Total time	6	4	8
Chawks/day/ plane	2	3	1
Days req'd for 2 x C-130	53	35	118
Days req'd with reassigned C-130's	53	35	35 18 16 total = 69 days/ 10 weeks

1. 60 pax/plane with personnel belongings.
2. 80 per cent availability of aircraft flying time.
3. Bukavu to Kongolo return flying time includes refuelling in Goma.
4. Chawks/ day is based on 12 hours daylight flying time.

Table 4

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
TRANSPORTATION COSTS ( WITH TRHEE X C-130)**

SITES/MODE OF TRANSPORT	RESOURCES	COSTS US \$K
Current sites (ZAP)		
Transport (North Kivu)	4 X bus 8 X truck	440
Transport (South Kivu)	3 X bus 6 X trucks	330
Transport (Air - Goma to Kindu) - 1 X C-130 at 3 /day	334 flying hrs	1670
Transport (Air - <a href="#">Goma. to</a> Mbandaka) 1 X C-130 at 1 chalk/day	1002 flying hrs	5010
Transport (Air - Bukavu to Kongolo) 1 X C-130 at 2 chalks/day	500 flying hrs	2500
Transit site (Kiadu)	1 X bus 1 X truck	80
Transit site (Mbandaka)	1 X bus 1 X truck	80
Transport (boat - Kindu to Lokanda) at 180 persons/day for 55 days	1 X boat	82.5
Transport (boat - Mbandaka to Irebu) at 60 persons/day for 167 days	1 X boat	230.3
Transport (road - Kongolo)	1 X bus 1 X truck	50
TOTAL	10 x bus 17 X trucks 2 X boat's 1,836 FH	10,523

1. Estimated costs.
- |                           |               |
|---------------------------|---------------|
| 1 X flying hour (FH)      | = \$5,000.00  |
| 1 X bus (Purchase)        | = \$50,000.00 |
| 1 X 3 T truck (')         | = \$30,000.00 |
| 1 X boat (rental per day) | = \$1,500.00  |

Table 5

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
TRANSPORTATION COSTS ( WITH SIX X C-130)**

SITES/MODE OF TRANSPORT	RESOURCES	COSTS US \$K
Current sites (ZAP)		
Transport (North Kivu)	8 X bus 16 X trucks	880
Transport (South Kivu)	6 X bus 12 x trucks	660
Transport (Air - Goma to Kindu) - 2 X C-130 at 3 chalks/day/each	334 flying hrs	1670
Transport (Air - Goma to Mbandaka) 2 x C-130 at 1 chalk/day/each	1002 flying hrs	5010
Transport (Air - Bukavu to Kongolo) 2 X C-130 at 2 chalks/day/each	500 flying hrs	2500
Transit site (Kindu)	2 X bus 2 X truck	160
Transit site (Mbandaka)	2 X bus 2 X truck	160
Transport (boat - Kindu Lo Lokandu) at 180 persons/day for 55 stays	1 X boat	82.5
Transport (boat - Mbandaka Lo Irebu) at 60 persons/day for 167 days	1 X boat	250.5
Transport (road - Kongolo)	2 X buy, 2X truck	160
Total	20 X bus 34 X trucks 2 X boats 1,836 FH	11,533

1. Estimated costs'.  
1 X flying hour (rat) = \$5,000.00  
1 X bus (purchase) = \$50,000.00  
1 X 3-T truck (\*) = \$30,000-00  
1 X boat(rental per day) = \$1,500.00

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
SITE PREPARATION COSTS - KONGOLO**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>VOLUNTARY US \$K</b>	<b>INVOLUNTARY US SK</b>
Time req'd to move	7 days	14 days
Movement costs - Eqpt/Mat		
Acquisition costs Eqpt/Mat		
Building repair costs	4,149	4,149
Acquisition cosh Defence stores		300
Total	4,149	4,649

1. Time req'd to move includes the travelling time from the home country through Kinshasa. for in-theatre briefing/preparation, to Kongolo. It also includes any preparation for the reception of the personnel being moved.
2. Time req'd does not include the refurbishment/repair required to be done.

Table 7

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
SITE PREPARATION COSTS - LOKANDO**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>VOLUNTARY US \$K -</b>	<b>INVOLUNTARY US \$K</b>
Time req'd to move	7 days	14 days
Movement costs - Eqpt/Mat		
Acquisition costs Eqpt/Mat		
Building repair ' costs		
Acquisition cosec Defence stores		
Total	3,090	3,590

1. Time req'd do move includes the travelling time from the home country through Kinshasa, for in-theatre bricfing/preparation, to Lokando. It also includes any preparation for the reception of the personnel being moved.
2. Time req'd does not include the refurbishment/repair required to be done

Table 8

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
SITE PREPARATION COSTS - MBANDAKA**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>VOLUNTARY US \$K</b>	<b>INVOLUNTARY US \$K</b>
Time req'd to move	7days	14 days
Movement costs - Eqpt/Mat		
Acquisition costs Eqpt/Mat	.	
Building repair costs	2,275	2,275.
Acquisition costs Defence stores		500
Total	2,275	2,775

1. Time req'd to move includes the travelling time from the home country through Kinshasa, for in-theatre briefing/[preparation. to](#) Mbandaka. It also includes any preparation for the reception of the personnel being moved
2. Time req'd does not include the refurbishment/repair required to be done.

Table 9

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
SITE PREPARATION COSTS - IREBU**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>VOLUNTARY US \$K</b>	<b>INVOLUN'TARY US \$K</b>
Time rcq'd to move	7 days	14 days
Movement costs - Eqpt/Mat		
Acquisition costs Eqpt/Mat		
Building repair costs		2,275
Acquisition cost Defence stores		500
<b>Total</b>	<b>2,275</b>	<b>2,775</b>

1. Time req'd to move includes the travelling time from the home country through Kinshasa, for in-theatre briefing/preparation, to Irebu It also includes any Preparation for the reception of the personnel being moved.
2. Time req'd does not include the refurbishment/repair required to be done

Table 10

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
SITE PREPARATION COSTS – ALL SITES**

<b>ACTIVITIES</b>	<b>VOLUNTARY US \$K</b>	<b>INVOLUNTARY US \$K</b>
Transportation costs - Kongolo		
Transportation costs - Lokando		
Transportation costs - Mbandaka		
Transportation costs - Ireba		
Refugees costs all sites		
Total costs		

1. The transportation costs includes the costs related to moving all supplies required by the UN personnel. The acquisition costs are included in the personnel costs.
2. The refugees costs include the transportation and acquisition costs of all goods required for the refugees.

Table 11

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE  
SUMMARY TABLE OF ALL COSTS**

<b>FACTORS</b>	<b>VOLUNTARY US K\$</b>	<b>INVOLUNTARY US K\$</b>
Security/month (first 6-months)	1,626	19,806
-Security/month (next 6-months)	126	7,200
Security (first 6-months)	9,756	118,836
Security (next 6-months)	756	43,200
Security/year	10,512	162,036
Movement (3 X C-130)	10,523	10,523
Site preparation - Kongolo	4,149	4,649
Site preparation - Lokando	3,090	3,590
Site preparation - Mhandaka		
Site preparation - irebu	2,775	2,775
Site sustain ment/ month		
Side sustainment/year		
Total fixed costs		
Total Costs/mnoth		
Total costa/year		

1. The total flixed costs include the site preparation and the movement costs
2. The variable costs include the costs of the forces involved with the protection and the sustainment costs.

**JOINT ZAIRE/UN COMMISSION ON THE SITUATION  
IN THE  
RWANDAN REFUGEES CAMPS IN ZAIRE**

**SCHEDULE AND ITINERARY**

1. The mission was conducted during the period of 26 September to 13 October 1994. The detailed itinerary was as follows:

- a. 26 September, 1800 to 2030 hrs - The first meeting conducted with all the members listed in paragraph 2 reviewed and confirmed the terms of reference which would guide the mission for its tasks. These are attached as Appendix 1;
- b. 27 September, 0900 to 1030 hrs - The members were received by Mr. Gustave Malumbu Mbangula, Vice-Prime Minister Minister of the Interior and Acting Prime Minister at the Ministry of the Interior. The points and resolutions discussed are attached as Appendix 2;
- c. 28 September - During this third day, various administrative details were completed prior to starting the visit. the sequence of activities for this day are listed as Appendix 3;
- d. 29 September - The Commission left Kimsbasa for Corns by UN aircraft. In Goma, the UN members of the team met with the Goma regional representatives from UNHCR and-discussed a possible itinerary for the next two days. The information obtained is at Appendix 4;
- e. 30 September - the fifth day of the Commission consisted of a series of visits and meetings. These were:
  - i. 0830 hrs - UNHCR Information meeting on the current situation within the Rwandan refugee camps within the area of North Kivu (Appendix 5);
  - ii. 1100 hrs - Meeting with the Acting Governor of North Kivu (Appendix 6);
  - iii. 1430 hrs - Visit of the Mugunga camp and meeting with some of the camp leaders (Appendix 7)-. and
  - iv. 1830 hrs - Meeting with military leaders of the ex-RGF (Appendix 8).
- f. 1 October -
  - i. The Commission members spent the morning waiting to travel to the Kabale refugee camp. They left at 1200 hrs and met the Kabale camp representatives in an hotel in Kiwanja. 10 kms north of Kabale between 1400 and 1800 hrs. The details of this meeting are in Appendix 9;

- ii. A sub-commission meeting was held with the military leaders at 1930 hrs, during which a list of the military components with their families for the North Kivu area was submitted (Appendix 10).
- g. 2 October - During this day the Commission travelled to Bukavu and held the following meetings/visits;
  - i. Visit of the Inera refugee camp at 1020 hrs (Appendix II);
  - ü. Meeting with the Vice-Governor of South Kivu at 1200 hrs (Appendix 12);
  - iii. Meeting with the UNHCR Bukavu/Uvira representatives at 1345 hrs during which the Commission's Zairian military members went to meet the local Zairian military commander (Appendix 13);
  - iv. Lunch at Mr. Mutiri-wa-Bashara's residence (1430 hrs), where the Commission members received "inside" information obtained by the Commission's Zairian military member from the local Zairian military commander (Appendix 14). Brig Gen Anyidoho left the area for Kigali, Rwanda at 1530 hrs to submit an interim report to the SRSG UNAMIR; and
  - v. Meeting with the Bukavu/ Uvira NGO representatives at 1700 hrs (Appendix 15).
- h. 3 October -
  - i. The Commission members traveled to the Pansi Rwandese military camp and met with the military leaders of the camp (Appendix 16). Mt. Jeddo Van Drunen left the Commission to return to Geneva;
  - ii. the Commission held a meeting with the representatives of the Rwandese political leaders in the Bukavu area at 1700 hrs (Appendix 17).
- i. 4 October -
  - i. Some of the Commission members met with an ICRC representative at 1530 hrs to discuss the status of the Rwandese ex-military currently in Zaire (Appendix 18);
  - ii. The Commission met with the South Kivu military leaders at 1800 hrs (Appendix 19).

2. The Commission members left Bukavu and started the next phase of the trip, which consisted of visits to different sites selected by the Zairian authorities for the relocation of Rwandese political leaders and military personnel:

- a. 5 October - Meeting with local officials and visit of a Zairian military camp in Kongolo, Shaha region (departed Bukavu at 1015 hrs and arrived in Kongolo at 1330 hrs). Two additional members joined the Commission in Bukavu: Mr. Collins Asare from UNHCR and Maj Phil Lancaster from UNAMIR
- b. 6 October - Meeting with local officials in Kindu. Maniema region (departed Kongolo at 1030 hrs and arrived in Kindu at 1130 hrs);
- c. 7 October - Travel to Lokandu by dugout and visit of a Zairian military camp (Departed Kindu at 1120 hrs and arrived in Lokandu at 1640 hrs);
- d. 8 October - Travel to Kindu by dugout (departed Lokandu at 1030 hrs and arrived in Kindu at 1940 hrs);
- e. 9 October - Travel to Kisangani, Upper Zaire region (departed Kindu at 0930 hrs and arrived in Kisangani at 1030 hrs). Unsuccessfully tried to have a meeting with the Vice-Governor and military commander of Upper Zaire;
- f. 10 October - Travel to Buta, Lower Uele sub-region and Mbandaka, Equator region (departed Kisangani at 0815 hrs, arrived in Buta at 0900 hrs departed Buta at 1230 hrs and arrived in Mbandaka at 1445 hrs). In Buta, the Commission members met the local authorities and were told that there were no sites to visit near Buta. In Mbandaka the Commission members met the Vice-Governor and the military commander for the Equator region; and
- g. 11 October - Four members of the Commission travelled by speed boat to the Irebu military camp (departed Mbandaka at 0830 hrs and returned at 1515 hrs) while other members visited potential sites in Mbandaka for political leaders. The Commission members left Mbandaka at 1700 hrs and arrived in Kinshasa at 1830 hrs.

3. The activities of the commission in Kinshasa consisted of completing the final report:

- a. 12 October (1700 hrs) - Meeting of the Commission's UN representatives to discuss the methodology for completing the final report;
- b. 13 October (0900 hrs) - Meeting of the Commission's UN representatives to review the proposed final report;
- c. 13 October (1400 hrs) - Meeting of the complete Commission to discuss the final report and
- d. 14 and 15 October were the work session to complete the final report